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ABSTRACT 
 
Lesser Victories: 
A Study of the Philippine Constabulary and Haitian Gendarmerie. (August 2007) 
Robert Yoshio Mihara, B.S., United States Military Academy 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Brian McAllister Linn 
 
 
 
Determining what constitutes the proper role and characteristics of a 
constabulary has received renewed interest in recent years as the international 
community increasingly involves itself in peace and stability operations.  The U.S. 
invasion of Iraq has further stimulated discussion over how foreign powers should go 
about establishing security institutions within a host nation, particularly in one as 
turbulent as Iraq.  Recent events in both Iraq and Afghanistan have made clear the 
importance of indigenous police forces, or constabularies, to pacification and state-
building operations.  Effective constabularies can perform the key role of separating 
insurgents from the population and giving substance and legitimacy to federal and local 
government.   
This thesis examines two U.S.-organized paramilitaries: the Philippine 
Constabulary (1901-1917) and the Haitian Gendarmerie (1916-1934).  It argues that in 
both the Philippines and Haiti, the constabularies became armies, and the instruments of 
autocratic rule, because American military officers allowed the militarization of the 
police forces to become institutionalized without also establishing normative constraints 
 
iv 
on the use of military power.   The thesis contends that American military authorities 
undermined the constabularies’ suitability for enforcing civil law by aggressively 
developing their military capabilities to meet the challenges of fighting violent 
insurgencies.  Both organizations generalized their pragmatic responses to immediate 
circumstances without considering the long term implications for them as institutions.  
The historical experience of the Constabulary and Gendarmerie testify to the real 
temptation for leaders to stretch an organization beyond its mandate or capabilities by 
focusing on success and victory over purpose and the ends for which the organization 
exists.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The subject of organizing indigenous security forces has remained relevant in 
recent years as the international community increasingly involves itself in peace and 
stability operations.  The U.S. invasion of Iraq has further stimulated discussion over 
how foreign powers should go about establishing security institutions within a host 
nation, particularly in one as turbulent as Iraq.  Recent events in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan have made clear the importance of indigenous police forces, or 
constabularies, to pacification and state-building operations.  Effective constabularies 
can perform the key role of separating insurgents from the population and giving 
substance and legitimacy to federal and local government.  John A. Nagl argues that 
constabularies are essential to establish the proper security environment for civic action 
and to isolate insurgencies being fought directly by foreign and indigenous military 
forces.  The Army’s 2006 draft counterinsurgency field manual, FM 3-24, devotes an 
entire chapter to constabularies and notes their advantages in performing local security 
tasks.1  
 
This thesis follows the style of the Journal of Military History. 
 
1. Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations 
Doctrine, 1860-1941 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2003), 3-5; John A. 
Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), xiv-xv; Hq., Department of the 
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The breadth of responsibility for security forces during pacification and 
stabilization campaigns exceeds the spectrum normally encountered during conventional 
wars.  These unconventional campaigns have political and social dimensions that 
complicate military operations and place unfamiliar demands on soldiers trained for 
conventional warfare.  Historically, indigenous constabularies appear as appealing 
solutions to military leaders seeking to impose order on complexity.  Constabularies fill 
a critical security role where the military and municipal police lack the means and 
mandate to control.  They insulate professional armies from performing police duties, 
cost much less than soldiers, and can possess clear advantages in interacting with the 
local population.  They also address the long-term issue of developing indigenous 
institutional capability in the occupied territory.2  However, the very ability of 
paramilitary police forces to bridge this security void makes them vulnerable to 
dissipation.  Leaders can feel compelled to employ them in solving every problem when 
very few effective organizations exist.  The history of past unconventional operations 
can provide insight into how such forces should be organized and employed and also 
reveal the potential consequences of getting it wrong.   
This thesis examines two U.S.-organized paramilitaries: the Philippine 
Constabulary (1901-1917) and the Haitian Gendarmerie (1916-1934).  The thesis 
contends that American military authorities undermined the constabularies’ suitability 
                                                                                                                                                
Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, draft, (Washington, D.C.: Hq., 
Department of the Army, February 2006), 6-1 to 6-20. 
2. Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st 
Century (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), 38-39; Andrew Rathmell, et al., 
Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience 
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2005), 86. 
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for enforcing civil law by aggressively developing their military capabilities to meet the 
challenges of fighting violent insurgencies.  Both organizations generalized their 
pragmatic responses to immediate circumstances without considering the long term 
implications for them as institutions.  The historical experience of the Constabulary and 
Gendarmerie testify to the real temptation for leaders to stretch an organization beyond 
its proper mandate by focusing on success and victory in the short-term at the expense of 
larger strategic concerns.  In the case of the Philippines and Haiti, American leaders 
involved with the constabularies did not provide for reforming the militarized 
constabularies as civil police forces or divorcing them of their domestic police 
responsibilities when such reform was no longer feasible. 
Although the United States accumulated a wealth of experience in establishing 
constabularies during the early twentieth century, historians and military professionals 
have given scant attention to these hybrid police forces.  Much of this inattentiveness is 
due to the broader stagnation of military thought within the Army on pacification and 
stabilization operations that have characterized Army doctrine since the end of the 
Second World War.3  Leaders in Iraq turning for guidance from dusty volumes printed 
half a century ago reveals how little has changed, or evolved, in the U.S. military’s 
general approach to unconventional operations.  One of the more prominent reference 
texts for current military planners is the Marine Corps’ much-heralded Small Wars 
Manual.  Published in 1940, this manual confidently prescribed that indigenous 
 
3. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 
260-61, 282; Richard W. Smith, “Philippine Constabulary,” Military Review 48 (May 
1968): 73; Robert M. Cassidy, “Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons from Guerilla 
Warfare,” Military Review 84 (September-October 2004): 41. 
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constables can be expected to take census, gather agricultural data, and perform virtually 
every other function of civil government.  It defines indigenous constabularies as the 
overarching security institution of an occupation, acting simultaneously as a military and 
as a police force.4  Despite its limitations, the 1940 Small Wars Manual provides better 
guidance than post-Vietnam U.S. military doctrine, which treats constabularies as 
peripheral military organizations between local police and the military.  Yet, the marine 
manual establishes no core functions or roles for constabularies, leaving the specifics to 
be determined by unique local conditions, and subordinates the constabularies as 
adaptable auxiliaries to conventional military forces.  The Small Wars Manual alternates 
between defining constabularies as an aid in accomplishing conventional tasks, as an 
optional component of host nation security forces, or as a buffer between military and 
civilian spheres.  It does not settle on a comprehensive definition for the role and 
purpose of constabulary forces, implying that they were not essential to any nation-
building effort.  The marine manual reflects the prejudice of military regulars held 
against civilian or irregular forces and the presumption that effective militaries could 
perform any mission if they could succeed in major combat.5
Today’s doctrine, which reflects the perceived lessons of the Persian Gulf War, is 
little better.  FM 3-0, the current operations doctrine, includes paramilitary forces, but it 
only stresses their general importance in stability operations and the necessity of 
 
4. U.S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1940), 12-1, 12-10. 
5. Hq., Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, 
D.C.: Hq. Department of the Army, 1976), 7-11; Hq., Department of the Army,  Field 
Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Hq., Department of the Army, 1982), 6-
9. 
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integrating them into the overall effort.  The manual omits the constabularies’ specific 
capabilities, and it ignores the necessity of grounding indigenous forces with a logical, 
complementary, distinct and tangible purpose.6  The Army’s doctrinal manual for 
tactics, FM 3-90, refers to paramilitary forces as one of several important host nation 
organizations but only in their ability to aid military forces in performing conventional 
tasks, such as base or route security.7  The counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-07.22, 
mentions indigenous police and paramilitary forces frequently and goes further than the 
general operations or tactics doctrine in identifying the particular capabilities of 
constabularies.  However, the manual blurs the boundaries between police and 
paramilitary forces by consolidating them into a general category with other host-nation 
security forces.  It recognizes local police and paramilitaries as separate organizations, 
but neglects to clearly define the distinction.8  FM 3-07.22 and similar manuals imply 
that paramilitary forces exist to provide a buffer between local police duties and military 
forces, U.S. and indigenous, shoring up local police forces when needed and preventing 
military forces from having their operational capability sapped by civil duties.9  
 
6.  Hq., Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, 
D.C.: Hq., Department of the Army, 2001), 9-9, 9-15. 
7. Hq., Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-90, Tactics (Washington, D.C.: 
Hq., Department of the Army, 2001), E-12, E-23. 
8. Hq., Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency 
(Washington, D.C.: Hq., Department of the Army, 2004), 1-6, 1-8, 1-10, 2-2, 3-3, 3-8, 3-
14. 
9. Hq., Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-23, Stability Operations 
(Washington, D.C.: Hq., Department of the Army, 1972), 4-5 to 4-6, 5-4, 8-8, 8-11, 8-13 
to 8-14, C-3; Hq., Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations 
in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, D.C.: Hq., Department of the Army, 1990), 2-13 
to 2-16, 2-18, 2-23, 5-7, E-2, E-4 to E-10, E-19, E-21; Marine Corps Warfighting 
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Produced jointly by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, the published draft of FM 3-24 
explicitly describes indigenous paramilitaries as necessarily distinct from host nation 
military forces.  It asserts that paramilitaries “should counter crime while the military 
should address external threats” and that “police and military roles should be clearly 
delineated.”10  However, the manual bases its dichotomy on a division of legitimate 
function without providing historical context or justification for requiring a clear 
distinction between host nation police and military forces.  Persistent inattention to 
paramilitaries in current doctrine, despite the U.S. military’s substantial experience with 
them, provides an opportunity for gaining important insight through historical studies of 
previous experiments with constabularies. 
Neither the Constabulary nor the Gendarmerie achieved the full aspirations of 
their early advocates.  Many of these advocates were military officers who attached their 
personal career ambitions in the Army and Marine Corps to the success of the 
paramilitaries.  These officers hoped that the indigenous constabularies, under their 
leadership, would become the leading institutions of U.S. authority.  Their 
accomplishments in pacifying the Philippines and Haiti required substantial assistance 
from U.S. military forces, and both constabularies had to reinstate military control over 
some, or all in the case of Haiti, of the territory over which they were responsible.   
The dependency of the Constabulary and Gendarmerie on military assistance 
highlighted their shortcomings as armies, and their claimed successes in establishing 
                                                                                                                                                
Laboratory, Countering Irregular Threats: A Comprehensive Approach (Quantico, VA: 
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2006), 9-11. 
10. Hq., Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency 
(Washington, D.C.: Hq., Department of the Army, December 2006), 6-9. 
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order and extending government authority obscured the long term repercussions of 
militarization.  Both constabularies sacrificed their ability to function as national police 
forces by trying to make effective soldiers out of their constables.  This decision would 
constitute an important factor in the troubled development of the Philippines and Haiti as 
republics in the post-occupation.  
There is comparatively little research on the American military’s efforts to create 
constabularies in the Philippines and Haiti.  The literature largely consists of studies on 
the constabularies’ performance as military forces without an examination of its 
relevance for the post-occupation era.  George Y. Coats’ dissertation on the Philippine 
Constabulary argues that its most significant contribution to the American Army’s effort 
in the Philippines was its role in pacifying the islands.  He consistently refers to its 
members as soldiers rather than as constables, chronicling their combat exploits across 
the archipelago from 1901 to 1917.  Coats does not address the institutional 
ramifications of subordinating the Constabulary’s police role to its militarization.  Nor 
does he consider the consequences of the deliberate choice made by civilian and 
Constabulary leaders to resource large military-style expeditions at the expense of 
policing the rural areas or improving the municipal police.  Fixated on military 
campaigns and Army-Constabulary rivalry, Coats fails to address the broader context of 
the Constabulary’s role in governing the Philippines as an American possession or an 
independent nation. 
Other historians have also focused on the Philippine Constabulary’s role as a 
military organization.  Andrew J. Birtle measures the security and civic actions of the 
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Constabulary as part of the broader Army-Philippine Scouts-Constabulary pacification 
effort following the Philippine War.  His focus on the methods that led to the campaign’s 
overall success obscures the inter-service bickering, the Constabulary’s rivalry with the 
Army, and its often serious effects on pacification.11  Like Coats, Birtle does not 
evaluate the Constabulary as a police force and an agent of the civil government. 
Focused on the Army and on military campaigns, he treats the Constabulary’s nominal 
mission – civil government and imposing law and order – as adjuncts to its military 
functions. 
The history of the Haitian Gendarmerie rarely escapes being subsumed within the 
broader literature on the U.S. occupation of Haiti.  Few works exist on the Gendarmerie 
specifically, and the bulk of the scholarship on the organization dwells on alleged abuses 
by gendarmes and on the Gendarmerie’s role in furthering American imperialism.  Few 
historians have been able to set aside their subjective views of the gendarmes in their 
work.  The only lengthy evaluation in print is James McCrocklin’s Garde d’Haiti, which 
is an overly sympathetic chronicle that relies almost entirely on the papers of a single 
Marine officer, Major Franklin A. Hart.  In his retrospective, Arthur C. Millspaugh 
credits the Gendarmerie for leaving Haitians better off after the occupation.  An 
American official in Haiti from 1927 to 1929, Millspaugh dismisses the alleged abuses 
of gendarmes as being the product of U.S. policy blunders and an allegedly indigenous 
proclivity towards committing such abuse.  He emphasizes improvements in state 
stability and infrastructure arguing them to be more representative of what the 
 
11. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 
154-58. 
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Gendarmerie provided to the Haitians than the alleged abuses.12  Both Hans Schmidt’s 
study of the Haitian occupation and his biography of the first chief of the Gendarmerie, 
Smedley D. Butler, castigate the Gendarmerie as an instrument of American 
imperialism.13  Schmidt’s ideological approach leads him to overlook or ignore the 
practical lessons of the Gendarmerie for future policy, and he does not examine its 
functions as an instrument of nation-building, only of American avarice.  Mary A. Renda 
adopts a similar perspective in her study of the occupation of Haiti as part of the rise of 
American imperial culture.  She argues that American interactions were informed by 
paternalism at every level of leadership, from the gendarme officer to the President of 
the United States.14 While some of these historians have lauded the gendarmes for their 
contributions and others bemoaned their abuses, none have attempted to evaluate the 
Gendarmerie as a civil police force or the consequences of its militarization as the Garde 
d’Haiti during the latter part of the occupation.  
The historiography does not measure either of the constabularies against the 
long-term U.S. objective of establishing stable governments apart from their 
contributions to the immediate aim of pacification.  Historians, such as Birtle, recognize 
the unique dynamic of unconventional operations and measure constabularies by their 
ability to meet its particular demands.  They recognize the special attributes of 
 
12. Arthur C. Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control, 1915-1930 (Westport, 
Conn.: Negro Universities Press, 1970), 88-89, 95-98, 194. 
13. Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 86, 89; Schmidt, Maverick Marine: 
General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987), 83. 
14. Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. 
Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 36. 
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indigenous paramilitary police, and focus on their effectiveness in performing military 
tasks.  However, one should ask whether those tasks should be performed by constables 
at all, and, if so, what the long term implications are of nascent police institutions 
conducting themselves as armies.  Without answering those questions, the 
historiography cannot fully inform the debate on who should be assigned the 
responsibility for organizing national police forces in collapsed or occupied states and 
how that agency, or those agencies, should go about the task.15
This thesis seeks to redress this historical omission by evaluating these 
organizations individually and then providing a collective analysis.  The next two 
chapters examine the Philippine Constabulary’s genesis and maturation as a military 
force through its campaigns in Leyte and Samar.  The case provides a historical example 
of emphasizing the military capability of a police organization at the expense of its law 
enforcement and civic functions.  Chapter II follows the Constabulary’s evolution from 
conception to rival army during the Luzon campaign from 1901 to 1903.  Chapter III 
focuses primarily on the period from 1903 to 1906 during the Leyte and Samar 
campaigns because of their marked impact upon the organization and the occupation as a 
whole.  
The fourth chapter examines the Haitian Gendarmerie’s rapid rise as a shadow 
bureaucracy with all of the powers of a military government through its initial 
militarization experience.  It focuses on the Caco Uprising in 1919 as another instance 
 
15. Roxane D. V. Sismanidis, Police Functions in Peace Operations: Report 
from a workshop organized by the United States Institute of Peace (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace, 1997), v, viii, 1-2, 4. 
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where military considerations reshaped a constabulary into an army.  The concluding 
chapter analyzes the course of the constabularies after the U.S. surrendered control of 
them to indigenous officers and explores some of the possible implications of the 
constabulary experience in the Philippines and Haiti for efforts today in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. 
This thesis relies upon official reports submitted by the Philippine Commission 
to the War Department, Congressional hearings on Haiti, daily diary reports from the 
Marine brigade in Port-au-Prince, and several important secondary sources to provide 
the essential framework of key events and personalities.  The official records and 
secondary sources provide structure and spawn important questions, but it is the personal 
correspondence and journals that allow us to interpret the purposes for these police 
forces and how leaders intended to accomplish their goals.  The letters, journal entries, 
and scribbled notes reveal the obstacles that the U.S. encountered in struggling to 
achieve the greater victory and to make the outcome of war relevant to their highest 
aspirations.  The manuscripts utilized in this paper were concentrated in five places: the 
National Archives I and Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.; the National Archives 
II in College Park, Maryland; the Alfred M. Gray Research Center at Marine Corps Base 
Quantico in Virginia; and the University of Oregon Special Collections in Eugene.  
Addressing this gap in the historiography will permit historians to understand 
more critically the Constabulary and Gendarmerie.  It will also provide insight to 
doctrine writers seeking to institutionalize lessons from previous pacification efforts 
undertaken by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.  If indigenous forces truly are 
 
12 
irreplaceable, as Nagl believes, it behooves the U.S. military leaders to understand their 
institution’s proper role in organizing such forces and how they should proceed if it is 
their mission, as it has been historically.  The invention and reinvention of the Iraqi Civil 
Defense Corps (ICDC) and the security architecture of Iraq indicate that defining the 
process for establishing indigenous forces remains a contested matter.16  This thesis 
seeks to clarify that debate by analyzing the development of the Constabulary and 
Gendarmerie under American leadership a century ago and asking what the 
consequences were of militarizing the national police forces of the Philippines and Haiti 
to the legacy of U.S. nation-building.  
 
16. Rathmell, et al., Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, 36-41. 
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CHAPTER II 
PRELUDE: THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY’S  
LUZON CAMPAIGNS, 1901-1903 
 
 
 From 1899 to 1902, a combined force of Regular Army and volunteer regiments 
fought against Filipino nationalists, religious sects, warlords, clans, and bandits.  By the 
spring of 1900, the resistance to U.S. occupation assumed the form of regionalized 
guerrilla warfare it would retain until the final pacification campaign ended with the 
battle at Bud Bagsak on Jolo Island in 1913.  Nationalist insurgents, brigands and 
guerrillas dominated the towns by intimidation, propaganda, and securing the 
cooperation of the landed elite or principales in spite of the U.S. conventional victory.  
Initially, the Army high command did not recognize that the composition of their enemy 
had changed from marching battalions into a mixture of guerrilla bands, banditry, and 
sects.  It only coincidentally adjusted to the nationalists’ new approach by dispersing its 
forces into small semi-autonomous garrisons.  
 Major General Elwell S. Otis, the senior Army commander in the Philippines, 
divided his command to promote the benefits of good government under American 
authority to the Filipinos.  Otis had come to recognize the existence of the insurgency 
and taken measures to combat it, but he continued to underestimate the intensity and 
pervasiveness of the guerrilla campaign as he relinquished command to Major General 
Arthur MacArthur in May 1900.  Otis believed that a deliberate program of civil affairs, 
 
14 
government, and localized patrols would be sufficient to defeat the unconventional threat 
by winning over the majority of the population.  MacArthur recognized the need to 
bolster security efforts but did little except offer amnesty to the guerrillas and sanction 
approaches already being taken by regional commanders.17
The change in the Army’s approach began from the bottom. American officers 
operating at the provincial and town level developed the beginnings of a 
counterinsurgency strategy by responding to the specific threat they faced and to the 
specific needs of their locality.  Army units immersed themselves in the environment, 
and their officers became involved in virtually every aspect of civil governance.  The 
most successful officers developed counterinsurgency measures that reflected the unique 
conditions in each town or district. Filipino auxiliaries became an increasingly important 
instrument for these leaders as U.S. volunteer regiments departed the Philippines.  
MacArthur had initially resisted recruiting for indigenous forces, such as the Macabebe 
Scouts, but under his tenure, the size and diversity of Filipino paramilitaries increased.  
Regional commanders organized local militia and police forces, as well as increasing the 
ranks of Filipino scouts.  In contrast to his modest goal of 1,400 scouts in May 1900, 
MacArthur had supervised the dramatic expansion of the indigenous scout contingent to 
5,500 men by June 1901.18  
In most provinces, American success at the local level severely constrained the 
mobility of the guerrillas and allowed mobile U.S. forces to concentrate and meet flare-
 
17. Brian M. Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 2000), 200, 213-16. 
18. Ibid., 210, 215-16. 
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ups wherever they occurred.  The capture of Aguinaldo and the surrender of Mariano 
Trías in March and April 1901 shattered the tenuous insurgent unity, and the subsequent 
pause in violence across most of the Philippines encouraged American leaders to assume 
that Filipino resistance would quickly decline.  Anxious to shed the Army’s troubled 
reputation, the McKinley Administration seized upon the opportunity for changing the 
look of American imperialism and established civilian rule over the Philippines under 
William H. Taft and the Philippine Commission on 4 July 1901.19  
 Taft had arrived in the Philippines on 3 June 1900 with an assessment of the 
occupation that differed greatly from MacArthur’s.  He held a more nuanced view of 
Filipinos in general and of the insurgency specifically.  Taft had taken a two month tour 
of the archipelago with members of the Commission and concluded that the insurgents 
represented a narrow cut of Filipino society.  In contrast, MacArthur believed that the 
resistance sprang from a widespread antipathy to American authority and ethnic 
sympathy among Filipinos.  Although Taft seemed to understand the nature of the 
nationalist insurgency better than MacArthur, he underestimated the challenges in 
implementing a balanced civic and military campaign to end the insurrection and 
lawlessness.20
Substantial antagonism towards the U.S. occupation persisted amongst the 
Tagalog elite in Luzon, and banditry, mixed with religious fanaticism, sustained 
 
19. George Y. Coats, “The Philippine Constabulary: 1901-1917” (Ph.D. diss., 
Ohio State University, 1968), 391-92;  Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in 
the Philippine War, 1899-1902 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 
16-19, 20-22, 23-26, 151. 
20. Linn, Philippine War, 216-17. 
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dangerous civil discord and violence throughout the Visayas and southern islands.  The 
sanguine view of U.S. administrators in the Philippines encouraged them to directly 
challenge the authority and mandate of the Army in the archipelago, both on the 
battlefield and in the halls of Congress.  The armed struggle with bandits and violent 
sectarians became a forum for the larger political contest between American military and 
civilian leaders.  The seminal event of the first years of civilian rule in the Philippines 
was not the pacification of any province or district but the passage of a 1903 
congressional bill that effectively subordinated the Army in the archipelago to the civil 
government in matters of internal security.  This political victory culminated Taft’s 
effort to reduce U.S. dependence upon the Army in establishing and maintaining order 
that began with him displacing the military governorship of the Philippines in 1901. 
As the first American civil governor of the Philippines and head of the 
lawmaking Philippine Commission, Taft administered the more populous of the 
provinces in the northern portion of the archipelago with 29 of the Philippine’s 45 
provinces under his authority.  The Army would only retain a few turbulent regions 
under martial law by the end of 1902.21  Taft and the Commission believed that they 
needed a security force of their own to guarantee the transition from military to civilian 
government, as well as to enforce their authority in the Philippines.  Continued violence 
by recalcitrant insurgents and bandits threatened the transition to civilian rule and 
strengthened the Army’s argument that the establishment of civilian rule was premature.  
Taft believed that the Army was too inclined to use brutal methods and that even the 
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most benign form of military rule would provide fodder for anti-imperialist attacks in the 
U.S.  Even nominally peaceful provinces required security forces to handle small groups 
of well-armed marauders in the volatile rural and remote areas.  Taft believed that local 
incidents of violence needed to be contained before they could threaten the legitimacy of 
civilian rule.  
The Commission established the Philippine Constabulary on 18 July 1901 
through the passage of Act No. 175, and Army Captain Henry T. Allen was appointed to 
the position of Chief of Constabulary.22  Taft and the commissioners believed that a 
native “semi-military police” organization, officered and trained by Americans, provided 
their best option for maintaining the peace and imposing civil governance.23  Luke E. 
Wright, the vice-governor, lobbied vigorously to create a force that would reduce the 
presence of the Army in the Philippines.24  He viewed the Army’s role as confined to 
defeating large scale insurgent forces and not in the chasing down of ladrones, the 
bandits and brigands that plagued a large part of the archipelago.  He and Taft believed 
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that American soldiers were poor instruments for pacification and shared the civilian 
consensus that organized resistance to American rule was over.25
Allen and the Commission organized the Philippine Constabulary according to 
the existing department system established by the Army, making boundary changes as 
necessity dictated.  The Philippine Islands were initially divided into four districts in 
1901.  First District consisted of most of northern and central Luzon. Second District 
included Manila, the rest of Luzon and the island of Mindoro.  Third District covered the 
Visayas, and the Fourth District initially included the islands south of Leyte and the Sulu 
Archipelago.  Fighting in southern Luzon, the Visayas, and northern Luzon resulted in 
the redrawing of some districts and the creation of a fifth provisional district in 1902.  
Each district was assigned an assistant chief who held the Constabulary rank of colonel.  
The districts were further sub-divided into provinces, under an American senior 
inspector who held the Constabulary rank of lieutenant colonel or major.  Below that, the 
provinces consisted of Constabulary stations that were responsible for the various 
pueblos, or towns, and commanded by inspectors and sub-inspectors.  
Each province was authorized to organize one company of 150 constables, to be 
recruited from amongst the population.  These companies were broken down into 
smaller elements to man the various stations within the province, usually supervised by a 
Filipino non-commissioned officer, a sergeant or corporal.  The organization did not 
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lend itself to conducting conventional large-unit military operations.  A full-strength 
Constabulary company could only patrol with a fraction of its 150 men due to the need 
to detach constables for administrative duties, garrison security, training, and normal rest 
and refitting.  The dispersion of companies also inhibited rapidly transferring them to 
other provinces.  The design of the Constabulary lent itself more toward local police 
duties than campaigning, assuming that constables could subordinate personal 
allegiances to their police duties.26
The practice of recruiting each province’s company from amongst its population 
was a conscious divergence from the Spanish constabulary or Guardia Civil.27  The 
Spanish had assigned constables outside of their home areas to prevent them from 
making common cause with the inhabitants and to reduce opportunities for corruption 
and political favoritism.  Allen and the Commission expected that forces recruited from 
their own communities would be less inclined toward abusing their authority and would 
more readily gain the voluntary cooperation and respect of the local population.  Wright 
asserted that constables “would be absent that disposition to abuse” when not “operating 
among strangers and often hereditary enemies.”  Wallace C. Taylor, district chief for the 
Third District, observed that “native troops from distant provinces are looked upon more 
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as invaders than supporters of law and order.”28  However, surging banditry and violent 
religious sectarianism threatened civil governance and immediately superseded the effort 
to recruit constables from the same locales they served in.  Constables from provinces 
with historical enmities were soon employed in troubled areas throughout the 
archipelago.  Moro constables served in both Luzon and Samar despite the assertion by 
Colonel James Harbord, commanding the Constabulary’s Fifth District, that they “will 
not mess with the Filipino and dislik[e] being associated with him, and the feeling is 
reciprocated.”29  Having ruled out the Army’s direct assistance, Allen could not afford to 
adhere strictly to ethnic and cultural niceties.30
Organized hastily, the Philippine Constabulary lacked an established leadership 
and a standardized training program.  It also suffered from inadequate logistical support 
and obsolete weapons.  The officers’ academy would not be established until 1904, and 
the Constabulary’s standardized basis for training, the Manual for the Philippine 
Constabulary, would not be published and widely distributed until 1906.  In the 
meantime, Allen had to rely on four captains seconded from the Regular Army and from 
volunteers taken from the regiments that were being sent back to the United States.  He 
rounded out his officer corps with modestly trained volunteers from college campuses in 
the United States and a small number of foreign expatriates.  By the summer of 1902, the 
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Constabulary had 193 officers selected personally by Allen from this motley pool of 
prospects.  The organization at its height peaked at approximately 300 officers.31  
The diversity of origins in the officer corps gave the Constabulary a distinct sub-
culture that set it apart from the Army and divided its officer corps into two distinct 
communities.  All Constabulary officers agreed that Filipino constables possessed clear 
advantages over U.S. soldiers as instruments for the post-war occupation, but Allen and 
other officers from the Regular Army understood those advantages differently than their 
colleagues without Army commissions.  They emphasized the negative political impact 
of foreign soldiers as occupiers and the high expense of maintaining a large U.S. 
garrison relative to the low cost of uniformed Filipinos.  These career military officers 
viewed indigenous troops as preferable for the work ahead.  Yet, they discarded few of 
the Army’s methods and tactics even as they sought to distance themselves from its 
reputation for brutality.32
Constabulary officers who were not drawn from the Regular Army were less 
wedded to military methods, but they rarely ascended to the senior positions in the 
organization where they could influence the direction of the force.  Ironically, these 
officers appeared more willing to cooperate with the Army than their Regular Army 
colleagues.  Fortunately for Allen, the division amongst officers did not impede the 
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effectiveness of the Constabulary and the initial cohort of officers included many very 
capable leaders.33  
From 1901 to 1906, the presence of several competent and steady Army officers 
served the Constabulary well in addressing the immediate problems of getting organized 
and trained for rural pacification campaigns within a short period of time.  District and 
provincial officers trained the constables they recruited using Army drill manuals to 
implement general guidelines from Manila.  Taylor protested this haphazard approach, 
“If a central school could be established our rapid advancement toward a perfect 
organization will be assured.”34  The lack of basic resources added further to the 
challenge of establishing the Constabulary.  Supplies of essentials such as first aid 
packets and ammunition were not available in sufficient quantities.  The initial allocation 
of ammunition for each constable armed with a single-barrel shotgun was limited to 
twenty-five rounds per year.  In a report to Allen, Taylor begged that the allocation be 
increased to fifty to permit leeway for marksmanship training.  His request remained 
shelved for two years before seeing it granted.35  Initially, the constables were armed 
with pistols or single-shot black powder shotguns, facing bandits with “high powered, 
smokeless, repeating rifles captured from the Spanish or stolen from army warehouses” 
and fanatics armed with bolos.36  
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Major General Adna Chaffee, commander for the Army’s Philippines Division 
from 1901 to 1903, adamantly refused Allen’s pleas for better arms.37  After several 
years of guerrilla warfare, Army officers worried about the threat of mutiny from the 
Constabulary as well as their own Filipino Scouts.  They were cognizant of the British 
experience during the Sepoy Rebellion in India where Britain’s superiority in arms 
helped them to defeat a force of mutineers armed with inferior firearms.38  The 
Constabulary’s critics warned that equipping constables with superior arms would 
accomplish no more than to supply the enemy with better weapons, through treachery or 
cowardice.  Chaffee persuaded Taft of his case and the matter would remain closed for 
several years.  In 1902, Allen succeeded in refitting much of the Constabulary with 
single-shot Springfields but without bayonets to defend against bolo charges.  Fear of 
rearming the bandits and insurgents still informed Army policy.  It would not be until 
1906 that the Constabulary received significant quantities of repeating rifles from the 
Ordnance Bureau in the form of Krag-Jörgensen six-shot rifles, too late to significantly 
impact the Luzon and Visayan campaigns.  The Army had decided that year to phase 
these magazine rifles out of their inventory and the issuing of qualitatively better arms to 
American soldiers made the change in policy politically acceptable.39
The early campaigns from 1901 to 1903 to consolidate control over Luzon and to 
complete pacification of the Visayas severely tested the constables, and their sometimes 
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narrow victories fed doubts in the minds of critical observers.  Allen had realized by 
mid-1902 that short-term methods such as shuffling constables around and relying upon 
local Filipino volunteers would eventually fail.  He needed a ready source of trained and 
equipped military forces to command, and the Philippine Scouts were an obvious choice.  
Congress passed An Act to Promote the Efficiency of the Philippine Constabulary, 
known alternatively as the Scout Law or Constabulary Act, on 30 January 1903.  
The new law empowered the Philippine Commission to appropriate the Army’s 
Philippine Scout companies at the order of the civilian governor-general, but it left 
responsibility for supplying the Scouts with the Philippines Division.  It also sealed the 
subordinate status of Constabulary officers without Regular Army commissions by 
stipulating that only officers with the Regular Army rank of major or higher could 
command Scout companies.40  The law also provided for the provisional promotions in 
the Army for the Chief and Assistant Chiefs of Constabulary to brigadier general and 
colonel respectively.  The rank requirements and provisional promotions eliminated the 
formal obstacles to subordinating Scouts, commanded by Regular Army officers, to the 
tactical control of the paramilitary police.  Allen wasted no time in availing himself of 
the newly available resource.  The number of Scouts appropriated for work with 
Constabulary increased rapidly from a token eight companies in February 1903 to thirty 
in July.  At least half of the Scout companies would be committed to supporting the 
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constables through 1907.41  The addition of Scouts profoundly changed the outlook of 
the Constabulary by providing it with much needed manpower at a critical moment, 
reinforcing its military orientation as an institution.  The appropriation of Scouts 
sustained the fiction of Constabulary self-sufficiency and the assertion that the 
Philippine Commission had pacification and state-building under control.  Both illusions 
would later be shattered in the campaign for Samar by 1906.   
Allen and Taft viewed governance in the Philippines as a zero-sum political 
contest between the civilian Commission and the Philippines Division.  They guarded 
the reputation of the Commission and the Constabulary against any claim that civilian 
agencies could not handle administering the Philippine Islands.  Their faith in civilian 
rule, their suspicion of the Army’s methods and motives, and their pronounced 
sensitivity to criticism encouraged them to accept the absence of adequate equipment 
and the rawness of the Constabulary’s recruits as the only viable alternative to military 
control.  Instead, they insisted that the Constabulary was as capable of controlling the 
provinces as the Army.  They clung to this perspective even as escalating violence in 
portions of Luzon and the Visayas suggested that the declaration of victory over 
insurgency was premature.  Allen sympathized with Taft’s fear of military primacy and 
defended the prerogative of the Constabulary against what he viewed as Army 
encroachment.  Allen praised the virtues of civilian rule over martial law in the 
Philippines and assured Taft that a Constabulary victory would “leave no doubt about 
our ability to deal with almost any ladrone or insurrecto measures that may appear.”  He 
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acknowledged that reintroducing military forces could bring the conflict to a swifter 
conclusion but warned Taft that the “military wants these provinces returned to their 
control.”42  
Chaffee repeatedly voiced his doubts to Taft of the Constabulary’s ability to 
manage all of the recently pacified provinces of the archipelago.  In the troubled 
province of Cavite, he urged Taft to delay the scheduled transfer of eight companies of 
U.S. infantry out of the region in 1901, but Taft refused to consent to any action that 
might support arguments that civilian rule should be abandoned.  Allen believed that the 
Philippine Scouts would ensure similar success for the Commission in future campaigns.  
Taft sided with Allen’s assessment and declined military offers for aid from Chaffee.  
Allen argued that ending unrest in the Visayas represented a crucial test for the new 
Constabulary and would legitimate civilian rule beyond question if the Commission 
could succeed without significant Army assistance.  He acknowledged that a cooperative 
effort with the Army would be more efficient in achieving pacification, but Allen 
believed that establishing the primacy of civilian rule and indigenous troops trumped any 
argument for a combined Army-Constabulary effort based on military efficacy.43  
In retrospect, Allen, Taft, and Wright were over optimistic about the 
Constabulary.  Allen engendered this by consistently understating the difficulties that his 
forces faced and seemed remarkably insulated from some of his field commanders’ 
astute observations.  Taft counted on the Constabulary to provide him with the means to 
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justify relieving the Army of its control, and he proved a willing believer in Allen’s 
sanguine estimations.  The optimistic assessments propped up a fragile success story that 
obscured the significant deficiencies that remained.  As field conditions worsened, Allen 
blithely predicted that the entire archipelago would be under civilian rule by August 
1902 and the Constabulary would be able to hold the provinces “without any active 
assistance on the part of the military.”44  Of the islands, Allen dismissed only Mindanao 
as too difficult for the constables to handle.  He had written off the Muslim population in 
the region as too unruly for civilian rule early on in his tenure. 
Allen’s optimism stemmed partially from his ambition.  A cavalryman and 
Philippine War veteran, he shared the aim of many Regular Army officers of career 
advancement through service in the Constabulary during a time of declining Army 
strength and scarce combat service.  J. Franklin Bell’s rapid promotion from major in 
1899 to brigadier general in 1901 only stoked Allen’s thirst for similar advancement and 
his willingness to use the Constabulary as a means to that end.  Allen developed a 
hypersensitivity to outside criticism of the Constabulary that became pronounced when 
Army peers and superiors openly questioned its capability.45  Allen’s perception of 
himself as persecuted would poison his relationship with many senior officers. 
 
44. Henry T. Allen to Luke E. Wright, 17 May 1902, Box 8, Allen Papers; Henry 
T. Allen to Clarence R. Edwards, 19 June 1902, Box 7, Allen Papers. 
45. Henry T. Allen to Albert J. Beveridge, 5 December 1901, Box 7; Henry T. 
Allen to Luke E. Wright, 10 January 1903, Box 8; Henry T. Allen to Herbert D. Peirce, 8 
April 1903, Box 8; Henry T. Allen to Henry C. Rouse, 13 April 1903, Box 8; Henry T. 
Allen to Andrew D. White, 27 August 1903, Box 8; Henry T. Allen to F. B. Wiborg, 27 
August 1903, Box 8, all in Allen Papers; Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and 
Contingency Operations Doctrine, 154; Twichell, Allen, 144.  
 
28 
Most Army officers, including those strongly supportive of the Philippine Scouts, 
were adamantly opposed to the organization of a native constabulary under civilian 
control.  The Army had organized the Scouts during the Philippine War as military 
auxiliaries, and, as the war progressed, Army leaders looked to them as the only realistic 
means of reducing the need for American garrisons post-pacification.  The Scouts would 
form the core of an independent Filipino army but only after the Army had completed its 
work imposing civil order.46  Army leaders extended the same logic to the Constabulary, 
conceptualizing it as subordinate to the military: “The prevention and suppression of 
insurrection and disorder should continue to remain in a great measure with the army, 
aided as largely as possible by the native police . . . and passing entirely under its control 
wherever and whenever an outbreak is anticipated.”47  
The Army high command accepted employing Filipinos in military or 
constabulary organizations as auxiliaries but not as the leading forces for pacification.  
William H. Carter, the Army’s commanding officer in the Visayas, shared the parochial 
view of many Army officers, but he also questioned the logic of employing 
inexperienced constables in military campaigns while his soldiers sat idly in garrisons.  
The Scout Act of 1903 further soured professional relations between the Army and 
Constabulary.  Not surprisingly, professional military opinion turned sharply against the 
Constabulary in 1904 when a mutiny of constables coincided with increased violence in 
Samar and Leyte.  The editor of the Army and Navy Journal echoed the sentiments of 
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many officers, “We have frequently expressed a doubt as to the wisdom of trusting too 
implicitly in the loyalty and devotion of native troops, particularly the constabulary.”48  
Allen’s insistence on pacifying Samar without the assistance of military forces in the 
field and his politicking with members of the Commission and Washington politicians 
only deepened Army officers’ disdain for the indigenous police force.49
Nevertheless, early events appeared to be a prelude to productive cooperation 
between the Army’s Philippines Division and Allen’s constables.  After Aguinaldo’s 
surrender, the Army concentrated its efforts around insurgents and banditry in the south 
on Samar, Cebu, and Bohol; and in the north on Luzon in the Batangas and Laguna 
provinces.  In 1902, Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell conducted operations against 
guerillas under the capable Miguel Malvar.  The constables demonstrated their 
usefulness by establishing a tight cordon around Bell’s punitive expeditions in Batangas, 
Lagunas, and Tayabas provinces.  Reinforced by several hundred local volunteers, the 
Constabulary prevented Malvar from finding relief in nearby Rizal province and 
escaping the constant pressure imposed by the Army’s ubiquitous patrols.  After several 
months on the run, Malvar and the last of his lieutenants surrendered to U.S. forces in 
April 1902.  The Constabulary netted an impressive number of prisoners and equipment 
for its modest operation: 574 insurgents and bandits, 348 rifles, nine cannons, and 
several hundred miscellaneous small arms and bladed weapons.  
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The Constabulary’s performance in Southwestern Luzon swelled Allen’s 
confidence but said little for the efficacy of the Constabulary.  The effort of the 
constables would have amounted to little without Bell’s well-coordinated and relentless 
expeditions.  The constables themselves only constituted a small fraction of supporting 
forces and relied heavily upon large numbers of Filipino volunteers and municipal police 
to bolster their forces.  Many of the additional volunteers and local police joined the 
effort in order to escape the retribution of Bell’s commanders, who endeavored to make 
non-cooperation painful.  Despite the Constabulary’s minor role, Army leaders appeared 
to welcome the additional assistance that they provided and took action to support their 
operations.  Chaffee volunteered the services of the Philippines Division’s medical corps 
to aid and care for wounded constables.  The Philippine Commission, in return, agreed to 
reimburse the Army for its expenses.  Allen spoke glowingly of the cooperation and 
goodwill between the Army, Bell specifically, and his organization: “We are operating 
in complete harmony with the military authorities who publicly recognize the value of 
the aid.”50
Bell’s pacification campaign in Luzon had provided sufficient stability for the 
Constabulary to begin establishing itself throughout the island.  The defeat of Malvar 
instantly opened up several provinces south and west of Manila for civil administration.  
The campaigns that followed, from late-1901 until late-1903, developed into two 
overlapping periods.  The establishment of constables as rural guards characterized the 
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first period.  Material limitations and inexperience led to improvisation and surprising 
successes in some provinces but not all.  Even in the success stories, the provincially 
focused Constabulary required substantial reinforcement to gain any initiative over the 
rising banditry following the fragmentation and collapse of the Filipino nationalists.  The 
critical moment occurred in 1902 when gathering bandit strength under former 
nationalist leaders threatened to overwhelm Allen’s ability to maintain civil control 
through raising volunteer militias and shuffling around Constabulary detachments.  The 
second period revealed an increasing militarization of the paramilitary police force and a 
clear rejection of Army-Constabulary cooperation.  The Commission turned to Army 
garrisons and Scout companies to guard urban centers while constables conducted 
military campaigns in the interior of Luzon, Leyte, and Samar in bid to secure civilian 
governance and supremacy. 
Sorsogan, situated on the northern side of the strait separating Luzon from 
Samar, was organized by act of the Commission on 30 April 1901 and was one of the 
first provinces taken over by the Constabulary.  It covered a modest 786 square miles 
and a population just under 100,000.  Harvey P. Nevill assumed his duties as 
Constabulary senior inspector and chief of the Sorsogan provincial detachment in 
December 1901.  The relative peace following the collapse of guerillas under Francisco 
de la Cruz lasted less than a year before bandits under Antonio Colache struck along 
Sorsogan’s coastal towns.  Colache had served as an insurgent under de la Cruz and 
previously as a soldier in the Spanish Army before his surrender to American forces.  He 
attempted to establish himself as a businessman but emerged from his failed venture in 
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the hemp trade disillusioned, turning to banditry.  His first reported raid occurred on 30 
March 1902 against the town of Bulisan, leaving several local policemen dead.  Nevill 
dispatched a Constabulary patrol to the town to investigate reports of the attack.  After 
surveying the damage, the patrol was ambushed by Colache’s bandits as it departed from 
Bulisan.  The ambush was a slaughter, and two members of the patrol escaped only by 
leaping from a cliff into the sea.  The attackers mutilated the fallen constables’ bodies, 
hacking them to pieces.51  
Nevill responded vigorously.  A week after the ambush, he pressed his men into 
the field, but his forays into the dense hemp fields with small patrols produced little.  His 
officers estimated that Colache’s forces numbered around 400 men.  In Sorsogan, the 
Constabulary only had 156 constables out of a total authorization of 162.52  Needing 
more manpower trap the bandits, Nevill withdrew all of his patrols and met with the 
provincial governor, Bernardino Monreal, to coordinate a final campaign.  The leaders 
agreed on a cordon around Colache’s sanctuary, where the population supported him, 
and to forcibly relocate townspeople outside the cordon into designated areas.  Monreal 
levied hundreds of local volunteers from the friendly towns to augment Nevill’s modest 
force of constables.  Nevill commissioned the town presidentes as field commanders to 
manage his newly organized battalion of volunteers.  
By mid-April, Monreal had his militia assembled and organized.  Nevill gave his 
orders to the presidentes, and from 17 to 19 April, they deployed their volunteers into 
three main lines to establish the cordon.  After two weeks of minimal Constabulary 
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presence, Colache interpreted the inactivity to be a sign of weakness and had already 
brought his men into the open, occupying three abandoned towns within the cordoned 
area.  Nevill capitalized on Colache’s exposure and attacked the northern town of Santa 
Cruz and the town of San Isidro to the south with his constables, driving the bandits 
toward the center into Santa Barbara.  A fourth column of 300 volunteers, under 
presidente Rufino Gerona, trailed behind Nevill’s constables, linking up with them at 
San Isidro.  Reinforced, Nevill sent a third of his force to investigate Santa Barbara.  The 
column of 115 constables and volunteers arrived on the 21 April and engaged 
approximately 150 of Colache’s bandits.  Inexperienced, the volunteers panicked and 
broke into a retreat, but the Constabulary inspector rallied them behind the fifteen 
constables and turned the battle against Colache.  Defeated, the bandits abandoned Santa 
Barbara and hunkered down in the hemp fields between towns to avoid patrols within 
the cordon.  Colache and his men could find no sanctuary or dependable access to 
supplies, and within a week, the bandit army began to rapidly disintegrate under the 
harsh privations.  
Nevill already had sufficient numbers of volunteers and temporary officers at the 
time of his attack on Santa Barbara to maintain constant pressure on the bandits and 
more reinforcements arrived over the following two weeks.  On 27 April, he received 
twenty fresh Constables from Masbate Province to relieve some of his exhausted 
detachment.  Nevill also deputized Gerona and another local leader as Constabulary 
inspectors to lead constables in the field, giving him the necessary depth to rotate leaders 
on patrol.  On 3 May, an additional officer and thirty more constables arrived in 
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Sorsogan.  With the added numbers, Nevill tightened his encirclement.  As the 
government forces closed in, a patrol came upon Colache’s encampment on 4 May.  The 
bandit leader managed to escape, but the constables succeeded in seizing a stash of 
documents.  The papers laid out Colache’s entire bandit support network in the towns 
and villages.  Nevill directed a series of follow-up raids that broke the back of Colache’s 
gang. Using information gleaned from the documents, he captured 143 bandits and 
sympathizers.  The converging forces finally met on 20 May 1902.  The cordon 
operation left the bandits thoroughly shattered, but Colache remained elusive.  Now 
focused on one man, Nevill disbanded the volunteers and pursued Colache with hired 
secret agents.  He finally caught up with the bandit leader when Gerona responded to a 
tip from an infiltrator.  On his own, Gerona organized a patrol and captured Colache and 
his deputy while they were encamped on 24 May 1902.53
Nevill’s pacification campaign demonstrated the Constabulary’s ability to 
manage bandit or insurgent forces in their early stages with active and able cooperation 
of the provincial government and municipal forces.  By winning the ruling elite to the 
government’s cause, they successfully completed the pacification work begun by the 
Army during its occupation of Sorsogan.  Nevill made the way for locals to take 
ownership of the campaign.  He led the fight, but the enabling manpower came from 
volunteers led by the ruling elite of the towns.  Even with the additional constables in 
May, the Constabulary could not have hoped to defeat the bandit forces.  Victory came 
when Nevill robbed the bandits of their sanctuary.  For that task, the hundreds of Filipino 
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volunteers were indispensable.  Colache’s bandits could not hope to survive after being 
effectively cut off from their support in the towns.  Without reprieve, they crumbled 
beneath the unrelenting pressure from combined civil forces upon their sanctuaries. 
To the northwest, in Tayabas Province, constables waged a simultaneous 
campaign against a loose band of recalcitrant rebels.  Tayabas was substantially larger 
than Sorsogan, covering 1,910 square miles, and populated by some 120,000 Filipinos.  
Ruperto Rios was the most notable among the bandit leaders of the province.  He had 
fought with Malvar’s forces before escaping Bell’s encirclement and fleeing to Tayabas 
in 1901 and declaring himself “Son of God.”54  Rios first engaged constables and 
American soldiers in an intense firefight in November 1901 and then largely remained 
out of sight over the following year.  He and his men escaped pursuit by exploiting local 
sympathy and melting into the population, hiding their weapons.  While in hiding, Rios 
steadily added to his ranks and bolstered his leadership by building up an array of 
“generals” and his own municipal government that paralleled the civil authority.  He also 
developed a network of willing supporters in the towns.  Aware of Rios’ growing 
network, constables searched the towns and imprisoned several hundred suspected 
sympathizers.  Esteban Herrera, a town presidente, represented the most notable arrest of 
these anti-sedition raids.  Rios ruthlessly terrorized the towns that aided the government, 
and constables descended on the home of anyone believed to be abetting the bandit army 
in the struggle for control of the population.  
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As in Sorsogan, the Constabulary gained the initiative in Tayabas by maintaining 
constant pressure on the bandits and separating the bandits from the population.  Unlike 
Sorsogan, the Constabulary lacked a capable leader of Monreal’s caliber to rally the 
presidentes and the population as a militia to fight alongside the constables.  Locals did 
not initially trust the government, and Rios possessed greater influence in Tayabas than 
Colache did to the south against Monreal.  Seeing the initial moral disadvantage he 
faced, the province’s senior inspector, Ben L. Smith, met with the Tayabas presidentes 
and labored to convince them of the government’s commitment to their welfare.  He 
eventually persuaded them to consent to a program of concentration, consolidating the 
populations of the minor barrios into the larger towns.  Sustained patrol operations by 
the Constabulary and cooperation by the presidentes deprived Rios and the other bandit 
leaders of supplies and easy refuge.  Rios’ forces began to seriously unravel as the 
Constabulary isolated them from the townspeople and continued to harass them into the 
spring months of 1903.  Several minor skirmishes through the summer of 1902 
culminated in a two of significant bandit defeats in September.  
The combination of battlefield losses and isolation produced a series of 
surrenders through the end of 1902, and the remnant of the bandit leadership never 
regained initiative over the government forces.  By April, Rios had fled into neighboring 
Laguna Province to find refuge and recruits.  While on the move, local townspeople 
offered him and his men shelter and assistance.  Rios gratefully accepted and entered one 
of the towns only to discover that the offer was a ruse.  The residents seized him, 
forcibly disarmed his contingent, and turned them turned over to the nearby 
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Constabulary detachment on 25 March 1903. Rios and his men were sentenced to death 
the following May.  His ignominious end illustrated the degree to which the local 
leadership had turned on him to the benefit of civil forces.55
The Constabulary defeated Rios’ bandits because they were able to deny the 
population to the bandits with a combination of aggressive action, demonstrating their 
resolve and capability against the outlaws, and a direct appeal to the town leadership.  
Two successive Constabulary senior inspectors applied the same combination of a 
patrolling offensive and population isolation that had been accomplished in Sorsogan, 
albeit with different methods.  The dramatic transformation of a barely tolerant populace 
to one that openly cooperated with the government testified to the power of locally-
based constables when properly led and employed according to their role as an 
indigenous rural guard.  However, the Tayabas campaign required outside 
reinforcements from other provinces at a time when cholera outbreaks in the archipelago 
and troubles in Cavite, Leyte, and Western Negros already strained the limited capacity 
of the Constabulary.  Constables ultimately prevailed in Tayabas without military 
assistance, but the victory was a narrow one.56
The Constabulary proved less able or adept in Albay Province.  Although they 
ultimately triumphed, the government campaign against former insurgents Simeon Ola, 
Lazaro Toledo, Augustin Saria, and Tito Saculo, went through a series of abortive efforts 
before time and bandit errors brought the violence to an end.  All of the bandit leaders 
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were veterans of the 1901 insurrection in Luzon under the insurgent general, Vito 
Belarmino.  From the summer of 1902 to the fall of 1903, Albay reeled under tit-for-tat 
exchanges between government forces and banditry.  For a province about twice the size 
and population of Sorsogan, the Constabulary only had 43 more constables than the 
smaller province to contend with an estimated bandit army strength of well over 1,000 
men during that period.  The bandits harassed several towns but focused their raiding 
primarily on the main road that cut through the province.  They struck throughout Albay 
and quickly expanded their operations into the adjoining provinces.  
The district chief, Major Jesse S. Garwood, attempted to quell the violence 
through direct negotiation with Ola.  However, the bandits felt under no compulsion to 
surrender.  The violence continued, and Garwood appeared impotent.  It was at this low 
point in the Albay campaign that the Scout Law took effect, and Allen quickly exercised 
his newfound authority.  He appropriated two companies of Philippine Scouts from the 
Army, sending them under Colonel D. J. Baker, Jr., a Regular Army officer, to replace 
Garwood as the senior Constabulary leader.  Baker employed the combined 
Constabulary and Scout forces much as had been done in the other Luzon provinces.  
Unlike Sorsogan, the volunteers participated very little in active operations.  Baker used 
the Scouts instead of Filipino volunteers to garrison the towns to free the constables for 
expeditionary work.  By 1903, Allen and the civil government had decided more needed 
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to be done in Albay and dispatched Colonel Harry H. Bandholtz to replace Baker on 13 
February 1903, with three additional companies of Scouts and 330 constables.57
Bandholtz, like Baker, was a Regular Army officer and familiar with the military 
method of concentration.  He accelerated the relocation process that had already begun 
under Baker, coercing Filipino locals to move into designated areas.  In all, Bandholtz 
moved approximately 125,000 civilians into camps that soon were centers of disease and 
malnutrition.  He defended the tactic as both humane and necessary.  Bandholtz 
observed that he could not adequately cordon off towns and simultaneously conduct 
patrols, and he denied that civilians suffered much from concentration: “There was no 
starvation, as all the people were given sufficient food for their needs, provided they 
performed some work.”58  Bandholtz also disbanded the local volunteer units first 
organized by Garwood to solve the manpower shortage.  He judged the untrained 
volunteers to be a waste of resources and a threat to the pacification campaign.  
Bandholtz found that their ammunition expenditure the previous year exceeded that of 
the constables and Scouts combined and that their ranks were riddled with bandit 
sympathizers.  A volunteer mutiny in Oas in February 1903 confirmed Bandholtz’s 
suspicions, and the availability of Philippine Scouts as adjuncts conveniently eliminated 
the serious need for volunteers.59
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 Like Rios, Ola and the other bandit leaders aided Bandholtz by making bold but 
costly attacks against Constabulary and Scout patrols and garrisons.  While they gained 
arms and enhanced their reputation, the losses suffered gradually reduced their numbers.  
Baker and Bandholtz’s concentration of the rural population made the losses more 
painful and prevented them from replenishing their ranks and supplies.  By August 1903, 
Bandholtz had substantially increased the number of patrols, blanketing the province 
with outposts.  The combination of losses, constant harassment, and low supplies 
triggered a wave of surrenders.  Captured bandits showed signs of malnutrition and 
severe tropical ulcers.  In September, Ola surrendered to government forces at 
Guinobatan.  Toledo and two other leaders followed his example one month later. The 
surrenders in September through November 1903 marked the end of the Constabulary’s 
Albay campaign.60
 The Albay campaign illustrated some of the challenges that the Constabulary 
faced in following the Army into many of these provinces, some of their own making.  
Sorsogan was exceptional in that the bandits made enemies of the town populations and 
that the provincial leadership responded aggressively to the threat.  Nevill was thus able 
to transform the locals into a willing and motivated arm of his uniformed forces.  In 
Tayabas and Albay, the dichotomy did not fall so cleanly.  Rios, Ola, and Toledo could 
claim support from substantial numbers of Filipinos, at least initially.  Constabulary 
officers in those provinces found it difficult to differentiate loyal local volunteers from 
bandit sympathizers and worried over their reliability.  However, not all of the officers 
 
60. RPC (1903), v. 7, pt. 3, 138-40; Coats, “Philippine Constabulary,” 95-101. 
 
41 
courted the locals as aggressively and astutely as Nevill in Sorsogan.  Bandholtz 
preferred calling upon Philippine Scout formations than relying upon Filipino militia.  
Even given the inclination, Bandholtz lacked the familiarity with local leaders in Albay 
as the third commander in as many years to contemplate a delicate integration in the 
manner of Nevill’s example. 
 The Constabulary continued to be confounded by its trained manpower 
difficulties during pacification efforts in Rizal and Cavite Province.  In meeting this 
challenge, Taft and Allen made excluding the Army a primary condition.  Sensitive to 
threats on their prerogative, both leaders believed that the Constabulary needed to hold 
its own in every territory handed over to civilian rule.  The authority to appropriate 
companies of the Philippine Scouts from the Army represented a major political victory 
for them.  It provided an alternative to calling upon Filipino volunteers or submitting to 
military authority whenever necessity demanded additional reinforcement, a routine 
occurrence over the following decade. 
 In Rizal, a confederation of ladrone bands gathered strength under Julian Santos 
through 1902.  By January 1903, the Constabulary estimated bandit strength at around 
300 men, armed with approximately 200 stolen rifles.  The banditry rallied under the 
banner of a new independence movement led by Luciano San Miguel, a rebel holdout 
from the Philippine War.  San Miguel arrived in the province from his refuge in Cavite 
on 15 January and immediately went to work consolidating his control by appointing 
various lieutenants and developing his political credentials.  They rampaged across the 
province under his leadership.  Armed with a claim to legitimacy, the bandits recruited 
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hundreds more into their ranks and eluded government patrols.  At their peak, the 
bandits under San Miguel numbered several thousand armed men and were aided by 
many more sympathizers in the towns.  His small army consisted of a motley mixture of 
recalcitrant insurgents and criminal opportunists, but many locals supported them as true 
nationalists against the constables and Scouts.  
Constabulary woes began almost immediately.  In January and February 1903, 
San Miguel’s bandits forced two detachments of forty constables into a retreat in 
southern Bulacan Province, across Rizal’s northern border, and encouraged a mass 
defection of provincial volunteers who immediately joined the bandit army.  To meet 
this challenge, Allen dispatched Colonel W. S. Scott with six Philippine Scout 
companies, totaling about 500 men, to Rizal.  Scott planned a conventional approach of a 
static cordon combined with a concentration of the population and expeditions within the 
encircled area.61  
Foreshadowing the frustrations of Samar, Constabulary expeditions chased after 
San Miguel and his men without success.  A detachment discovered him with several 
hundred bandits in his fortress headquarters in late-February, but Scott could not 
concentrate his forces quickly enough to pin San Miguel down before he fled.  The 
extended campaign in Rizal translated into real problems for provinces loaning 
constables to Scott’s force as they struggled to maintain the peace with their reduced 
garrisons.  To prevent a resurgence of ladrone activity, Allen appropriated an additional 
six Scout companies to sustain them.  The supplemental support within Rizal and in 
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other provinces allowed Scott to sustain his campaign, and the relentless patrolling 
began to produce results on the heels of the debacles in southern Bulacan.  Over a two-
month period, chance encounters and fatigue gradually wore down San Miguel’s forces.  
Between February and March 1903, the Constabulary estimated that the bandit leader 
lost as much as a third of his personal force.  
It was a chance encounter that finally trapped San Miguel on 27 March.  Two 
Scout companies stumbled upon a well-camouflaged fortress between the towns of 
Caloocan and Mariquina.  The Scouts charged over the eight-foot walls at the defenders 
and cornered San Miguel with his personal bodyguards, killing the bandit leader with a 
rifle volley.  His followers scattered in the wake of his death and the capture of Julian 
Santos two weeks earlier.  By May 1903, the uprising he inspired had faded away with 
the key leaders captured or in hiding.62
As Rizal quieted, Cavite continued to roil with violence.  Several independent 
bands, numbering several hundred strong, challenged government control.  Twice in 
1902, Constabulary detachments narrowly escaped complete massacres when ambushed 
by marauding bandits.  Allen disputed assessments by Chaffee and others that constables 
could not manage the province and remained committed to advancing the Commission’s 
cause, denying any need for Army direct assistance.  Taft and Allen agreed to utilize 
Army soldiers to garrison important towns only as a means to free up constables and 
attached Philippine Scouts for active operations.63
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The pacification effort in Cavite unfolded in the familiar pattern that 
characterized the Constabulary’s other campaigns.  Allen spoke glowingly of 
incorporating Filipinos as an innovative means for pacification, but the most substantial 
effort to reach out was the inclusion of a modest number of local Filipino volunteers 
with Constabulary detachments.  In a pattern seen elsewhere, Constabulary fortunes in 
Cavite often flowed opposite of concurrent campaigns in neighboring provinces as 
bandits fled pressure from one province, seeking refuge in another.  As Rizal sapped 
Constabulary manpower, Allen also surged detachments from other provinces to shore 
up the effort in Cavite.  Overall strength in the province rose to 1,200 constables by July 
1902 out of a total Constabulary strength of about 5,000.64  The significant investment in 
men and materiel failed to decisively stem the banditry.   
Before relieving Garwood in Albay, Baker commanded nearly a quarter of the 
Constabulary’s men and thousands of Filipino volunteers in his bid to quell the violence 
in Cavite.  He failed to employ them to good effect, and bandits routinely leaked through 
his cordons.  As in Bell’s campaign, Baker relied upon the volunteers to fill gaps in his 
line and reinforce garrisons.  Frustrated, Baker accused the volunteers of being 
ineffective, and he abruptly disbanded his corps of Filipino militia.  Sharing Bandholtz’s 
antipathy for the volunteers, Baker considered them a waste of money and more of a 
help to the bandits than to the government.  The Scout Act still awaited approval in 
Congress.  So, Baker could not rely on substantial replacements from the Philippine 
Scouts to compensate for the disbanded volunteers.  Inconclusive fighting convinced 
 
64. Henry T. Allen to Henry C. Corbin, 9 May 1902, Box 7, Allen Papers. 
 
45 
him by mid-1902 that the civil effort required more draconian measures.  In a startling 
admission, Baker recommended that the writ of habeas corpus be suspended in Cavite.65
Scott, Baker’s successor, assumed command of the combined forces and initiated 
a deliberate campaign under the leadership of Cavite’s senior inspector, T. R. Hayson.  
Hayson reinstituted the use of volunteers and directed hundreds of patrols from August 
1902 to July 1903.  His early operations brought in scores of prisoners, but conditions in 
the province remained chaotic.  Hayson laconically commented that the “conditions in 
this province are bad and have always been.”66  Brief periods of relative inactivity would 
be interrupted by raids on towns and at least one incident where a Constabulary 
detachment was nearly massacred in November 1902.  After two years, bandits shattered 
any illusion of progress when they initiated a new wave of reprisals in 1905, 
assassinating and torturing government sympathizers.  The reign of terror led many 
Filipinos to flee as refugees to neighboring provinces.  The government would not bring 
a decisive end to the violence until 1906, and then, only after having suspended habeas 
corpus and having committed thousands of constables, Filipino scouts, volunteers, and 
soldiers to several years of fighting.67
Cavite represented only one of several trouble spots that encouraged doubts as to 
the timing of civil rule and of the Constabulary’s readiness by the end of 1902.  A 
column in the Army and Navy Journal pointed to the turmoil in the provinces 
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surrounding Manila and declared that the “change from military to civil rule in the 
islands was premature and of doubtful wisdom.”68  The Commission, with Allen’s 
encouragement, resisted calls from Army leaders to turn Cavite and other provinces over 
to Army stewardship.  
However, in 1903, Allen and the Commission had some reason for optimism.  
They had wrested a major concession from the Army by convincing Congress to give 
them nearly unconditional access to the Philippine Scouts.  The additional manpower 
allowed the Constabulary to quell banditry in several provinces, and it appeared to Allen 
and the commissioners that civilian government was turning a corner.  Luzon seemed 
calmer than at any time previous under American rule, with the notable exception of 
Cavite.  In the Visayas, Leyte appeared to be manageable based on reports, and Allen 
voiced confidence that constables would repeat the purported success achieved in Rizal 
again in Samar.  Mindanao and the Sulu islands remained distant concerns for the 
Philippine Commission, and early evaluations of Moro constables sounded promising.  
The battles, while bloody, seemed relatively brief in hindsight and the Constabulary 
survived them all with civilian authority intact.  They comforted themselves in the 
victories and felt vindicated by the low desertion rates and stories of Constabulary valor.  
Wright, addressing a crowd in Ohio, declared confidently that the “the passion excited 
by years of unrest and insurrection are fast dying away,” asserting that the Filipino 
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people “now recognize and appreciate the spirit of humanity and justice which has 
characterized the American administration of affairs.”69  
The new optimism in 1903 reflected a significant change from the 
Constabulary’s perspective and approach to pacification through much of 1902.  The 
campaigns in Sorsogan and Tayabas demonstrated the Constabulary’s dependence on 
Filipino militia and local leaders to muster the necessary strength and to isolate the 
bandits from the population.  The availability of Filipino Scout companies contributed to 
a pronounced shift towards militarizing the Constabulary by eliminating the need for the 
volunteers and reducing the importance of reliable municipal leaders.  Allen and the 
Commission no longer believed that they needed the Army or local volunteers to 
succeed against renewed violence.  Instead, they relied upon Scouts to aid the 
Constabulary whenever the banditry exceeded its ability to manage alone.70  Scott’s 
Rizal campaign succeeded in quelling the violence and validated their confidence in 
being able to handle banditry and lawlessness with Scout support.  
Looking ahead, Allen and the Commission did not appreciate the narrowness of 
their victory in holding onto Luzon.  In 1903, their correspondence revealed little 
concern over the inconclusiveness of Cavite or an inkling that the bloodiness of Albay, 
Tayabas, or Rizal should be seen as the harbinger of worse things to come.  Taft and 
Allen had committed themselves from the beginning to keeping the Army out of their 
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pacification effort.  The self-imposed imperative to keep civilian provinces civil trapped 
the Constabulary into an impossible situation.  Poorly trained and equipped, the 
Constabulary inherited provinces rack with deep social divisions and bitter enemies.  
Several thousand fresh Filipino constables, ambitious Army officers, and adventurous 
expatriates attempted to finish the difficult work that the Army had only begun, without 
the Army.  Allen initially relied on provisional Constabulary battalions he cobbled 
together, but the violence and lawlessness was too great to manage with only his 
constables.  It was the Congressional authorization to claim Philippine Scout companies 
from the Army that staved off disaster.  Allen relied heavily on the Scouts to reinforce 
his active campaigns and to prevent provinces with depleted Constabulary detachments 
from slipping into disorder.  At its peak of 7,000 constables, the Constabulary could only 
hold ground it controlled by borrowing Scout companies.  Relatively manageable flare-
ups such as Sorsogan and Tayabas represented the positive exception rather than the 
general rule from 1901 to 1903.  In the other contested provinces, the Constabulary 
transitioned from crisis to crisis.  Allen’s strategy of relying on Scouts instead of civic 
mobilization or allowing for direct Army intervention would face more daunting trials as 
the Commission expanded its rule southward and the Constabulary attempted to continue 
its formula for pacification in the wildernesses of Samar from 1903 to 1906. 
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CHAPTER III 
TRIAL: THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY’S  
VISAYAN CAMPAIGNS, 1902-1906 
 
 
The Philippine Commission created the Constabulary “to prevent and suppress 
brigandage, insurrection, unlawful assemblies and breaches of the peace” without having 
to rely on the U.S. Army.  However, from late-1902 to 1907, the militarization of the 
Constabulary rendered it a poorly resourced rival to the Army.  By the end of 1902, 
Allen was forced to deploy a substantial number of his constables to deal with armed 
resistance to government authority in Bulacan, Rizal, and Cavite provinces, and across 
the Visayan islands - especially Leyte and Samar.71  The intensity of the violence in the 
affected provinces required more forces than the Constabulary Act authorized and the 
Philippine Commission could afford, and Allen could only contain the crisis by diverting 
significant portions of Constabulary garrisons from calmer districts and with the help of 
thousands of Filipino Scouts.  By 1905, unrest on Luzon had subsided sufficiently for 
the Secretary of Commerce and Police to optimistically declare that the island was “in a 
condition of unprecedented tranquillity [sic].”72  Yet, even as the Constabulary gained 
control over Luzon, the escalating violence in Leyte and Samar threatened to discredit 
the civilian government’s ability to administer the Philippines. 
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In 1904, Leyte and Samar, narrowly separated by the San Juanico Strait, 
constituted the greatest challenges for the Constabulary in the Visayas.  The topography 
of both islands was characterized by sharp relief between the mountainous interiors and 
fertile coastal plains.  Leyte had relatively substantial coastal areas capable of supporting 
sufficient food crops for the island’s population.  In contrast, Samar’s low-lying areas 
were much smaller than Leyte’s and isolated by forbidding mountain and jungle terrain.  
“Interior Samar was a place of great snakes and malaria mosquitos [sic] and sludgy, 
oozing swamps,” recounts one observer, “It was a place calculated to try the stamina of 
the fighting men who forced the bush of the interior.”73  Its 5,000 square miles lacked 
sufficient arable land to support the population with food and adequate roads to make 
communication possible by any other means than by boat.74
Leyte and Samar also contained a complex mix of religious sectarians and 
disaffected mountain villagers who conducted periodic raids on the coastal towns.  The 
surrender of Filipino nationalist guerrillas under Vicente Lukban in 1902 did nothing to 
resolve the long standing grievances between the coastal population and mountain 
villagers.  Consequently, the end of the war failed to produce the closure to localized 
resistance the Commission had hoped for and expected.  Instead, many mountain 
peasants continued to aid anti-government brigands and sects, both to strike back at 
exploiting Filipino elites and to avoid harsh retribution.  Natural disasters such as 
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epidemics occasionally exacerbated anti-government sentiment prompting rumors of an 
American plot to poison the wells.75
By 1903, a broad syncretic movement had spread across the Visayas that fused 
Catholic doctrine with native animism.  Generally known as pulajanes, the religious 
insurrectionists were led by a group of former Dios-Dios leaders, recalcitrant 
revolutionaries, and former criminals.  The evident religious fervor and wild melee 
tactics of the pulajanes movement led many contemporary observers to mistakenly 
dismiss it as a resurrection of the defeated Dios-Dios movement.  The Dios-Dios sect 
had clashed with American soldiers and marines in Samar during the Philippine War.  
The pulajanes shared many religious practices with the Dios-Dios, including the use of 
charms to deflect bullets, but the newer group incorporated a more diverse body of 
leaders than had its predecessor.  The spiritual head of the pulajane movement, Pablo 
Bulan or “Pope Pablo,” anointed several defeated insurrecto and ladrone leaders as 
pulajane chiefs and granted them his blessing to establish themselves throughout Samar 
and Leyte for their own ends.  A diverse group of anti-government leaders in the Visayas 
would use the religious vision of the pulajane movement to legitimize their campaigns 
against government and military forces.  Tapping into the embedded cultural animosity 
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within the population, Bulan and others rapidly established their sectarian movement 
throughout the island provinces of Leyte and Samar.76
Allen confidently assured the Commission that the Constabulary was up to the 
task of quelling this latest sectarian uprising: “Leyte is giving us considerable work at 
present, but I do not doubt that we will be able to run down all those who are still out in 
arms and that in a short time the complete pacification of the province will follow.”77   
Even before having secured access to the Philippine Scouts in 1903, he believed that the 
Constabulary could overcome the pulajanes with whatever recruits it could muster and 
with the active support of local elites.  Allen conceded that the campaign would take 
time, but he never seriously questioned the validity of his basic strategy throughout the 
Constabulary’s campaign across Leyte and Samar from 1902 to 1907. 
Allen had developed his approach to counterinsurgency while he commanded 
units of the 43rd U.S. Volunteer Infantry during the regiment’s campaigns in the Visayas 
from 1900 to 1901.  The regiment divided its 1,200 soldiers between two of the islands. 
Two battalions under Allen occupied Samar while the third battalion under Colonel 
Arthur Murray, the regimental commander, established itself on Leyte.  Commanding 
fewer than 900 infantrymen of the 43rd, Allen attempted to overcome resistance and 
extend American control by combining harsh punitive measures against locals 
 
76. Army and Navy Journal 44 (12 January 1907): 528; Linn, “The Pulahan 
Campaign: A Study in U.S. Pacification,” War in History 6 (January 1999): 45-49; Linn, 
Philippine War, 175-76; Sturtevant, Uprising, 128-29; Pulajanes is one of multiple 
spellings found in the sources. This spelling was selected because of its common use by 
W. C. Taylor of the Third District in his reports. The alternative spellings include 
pulajan, pulahan, polajan, polagan, and pulahane; Bolos were the indigenous weapons 
frequently used by guerrillas in mass charges. They resembled long knives or machetes 
77. Henry T. Allen to William H. Taft, 19 April 1902, Box 7, Allen Papers. 
 
53 
cooperating with the insurgents and the liberal use of indigenous troops organized from 
the local communities.  
His efforts on Samar initially produced promising results.  Allen expanded the 
U.S. zone of influence far beyond the coastal enclaves envisioned by his superiors, 
Murray and Brigadier General William A. Kobbé.  However, by April, Allen’s 
achievements rapidly unraveled as insurgents overwhelmed Allen’s far flung garrisons 
and terrorized towns that had cooperated with him.  Seeking to reestablish control, Allen 
responded with a series of punitive actions that failed to decisively weaken the 
insurgency but inflicted deprivation upon many local villagers caught in the middle of 
the conflict.  Fortunately for Allen, the department commander, Brigadier General 
Robert P. Hughes, shielded him from the severe criticism targeted at him for the 
reversals he suffered in April, and Major General Arthur MacArthur’s decision to 
temporarily surrender the interior of Samar to insurgents saved Allen from reaping the 
shortcomings of his strategy.  Allen’s apparent successes on Samar and Leyte convinced 
him that a small force of well-led indigenous troops could defeat any insurrectionists.  
His approach to pacification would receive its severest test in the Visayas, beginning 
with Leyte.78
As most of the Constabulary concentrated on pacifying Luzon in 1902, 
constables under the leadership of Captain Peter Borseth struggled to stamp out unrest in 
Leyte Province, which included the small neighboring island of Biliran.  Borseth had 
been assigned to Leyte as the province’s senior inspector after its transfer to civilian rule.  
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The significant power of the pulajanes over many poor Filipinos represented one of the 
important long term challenges Borseth and his district commander, Lieutenant Colonel 
Wallace C. Taylor, needed to overcome.  Isolated villagers seemed particularly 
susceptible to the teaching of the numerous “popes” and vulnerable to coercion.79  The 
historical enmity between the highland villagers and the peoples of the coastal lowlands 
made them ready recruits, especially during difficult times.  A significant feature of 
Taylor’s strategy was to eliminate this source of pulajane manpower by gaining the 
sympathy of the indigenous population.  Initially, Filipino villagers rewarded his efforts 
by passing on valuable intelligence and providing friendly bases of operation for his 
constables.80  
Taylor would establish himself as one of the Constabulary’s fiercest jungle 
fighters, once fighting on after being hit in the jaw with a pulajane .45 caliber bullet.  
Yet, he held a relatively humane view of the Leyte population and rejected relying upon 
force alone to enforce order.  Instead, he insisted the “establishment of society on so firm 
a basis that the depradations [sic] committed by small bands can not disrupt it and cause 
the members to break away  . . . and join the murderous raids upon neighboring 
settlements.”81  Taylor initially shared Allen’s belief that a relatively small number of 
locally organized Constabulary detachments could succeed in chasing down ladrones 
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and pulajanes with the support of local Filipino leaders in the towns.  However, by 1905, 
months of indecisive fighting would lead Taylor to openly question the efficacy of this 
strategy. 
Despite the Constabulary’s other troubles, Borseth’s initial response to the 
pulajane raids and his efforts to reestablish government control appeared promising.  In 
harmony with Allen’s favored strategy, he developed a rapport with local officials while 
briefly acting as Leyte’s provincial governor when the civilian administrator resigned in 
March 1903.82  Taylor testified that Borseth had made himself “popular throughout his 
province,” giving the district chief hope that the lawlessness would end without much 
difficulty.83  However, Borseth’s politicking had little impact on the insurgency as 
evidenced when a pair of pulajane raids on Biliran towns in September 1902 
overwhelmed local forces and resulted in the death of several Filipinos, three constables, 
and the loss of two firearms.  Borseth, with the cooperation of a Biliran presidente, 
responded to the September raids by organizing a force of nearly 400 bolomen to 
augment the constables and municipal police of eastern Leyte.  The combined force 
succeeded in limiting pulajane traffic from Samar’s western coast to Biliran Island, but 
Borseth lacked sufficient forces of any kind to control the entire Leyte coastline.  
Drought and disease also mitigated the inroads made with the local population.  Low 
rainfall and cholera outbreaks generated unrest as quarantine measures and potential 
food shortages undermined local goodwill towards constables and the government.  
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In October 1902, pulajanes struck throughout the island concurrent with a 
general rise in lawlessness across the Visayas in late 1902.  The most intense fighting 
between pulajanes and constables centered in and around the town of Ormoc on Leyte’s 
western coast.  Even with reinforcements from Cebu and Negros, the Constabulary could 
not eliminate the pulajanes and succeeded only in driving them between Ormoc and 
Biliran, while they continued to raid the towns in their path.  The pulajanes inflicted the 
most grievous loss of the year to the Constabulary on 14 November when a night raid 
surprised the garrison at Dolores, one of Ormoc’s barrios.  Of the eighteen constables 
present, the pulajanes killed two and wounded eight others before they were repulsed.  
Although the violence in Leyte concerned Allen, he could do little to reinforce Borseth 
that winter as even greater violence plagued towns in Cavite and Samar.84
Passage of the Scout Act and success on Luzon in 1903 allowed Allen to divert 
more forces from the northern island to assist Taylor’s constables.  Reinforced, the 
Constabulary succeeded in reducing the endemic violence on Leyte, but failed to 
decisively end the insurgency or capture Faustino Ablen, the principal pulajane leader.  
The next major engagement between pulajanes and government forces did not occur 
until late-August 1904 when Captain Henry Barrett, Borseth’s replacement as Leyte’s 
senior inspector, attacked a pulajane fort.  The defenders threw back the assault and 
killed Barrett.  The loss of their commander sent the constables into a panicked retreat, 
leaving Barrett’s body on the field.  It would be another six months before the 
Constabulary resumed the offensive against Ablen’s pulajanes by assaulting their 
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stronghold south of Ormoc where Barrett had been killed.  Aided by a contingent of 
local volunteers, the Constabulary force took the fortress and captured thirty pulajanes 
and killed three.  Two major engagements followed between February and July 1905 in 
which an additional twelve pulajanes were killed, including one of Ablen’s chief 
lieutenants – Juan Tamayo.85
Tamayo’s death preceded another year of apparent pulajane inactivity and 
general tranquility in Leyte.  However, the peace was illusory.  Pulajanes under Felipe 
Ydos, another Ablen subordinate, shattered the calm by defeating government forces in a 
series of engagements.  On 19 July 1906, 300 hundred pulajanes raided the municipal 
police station in Burauen, in central Leyte, killing five policemen and seizing fifteen 
rifles.  Two days later, a force of 34 constables led by two officers blundered into 500 
pulajanes in the vicinity of the same town.  The Constabulary lost one of its officers, 
twelve constables, twelve rifles, and two pistols in the uneven battle.86
The shocking defeats of July shook the Commission’s confidence in the 
Constabulary. Henry C. Ide, Wright’s successor as Governor-General, directed that 
Major General Leonard Wood, commander of the Philippines Division, reinforce Allen’s 
constables in Leyte.  Wood agreed to send one battalion each from the 8th and 24th 
Infantry.  Freed of major burdens in Samar and Cavite, Allen could also afford to send 
additional constables and able officers to the province.  Unlike Samar, the Constabulary 
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would not be required to cede part of Leyte to military control in order to gain their 
active participation in the pacification campaign.87
The addition of Army infantry proved decisive to the Leyte campaign.  They 
inflicted heavy casualties on Ablen’s forces, forcing him to impress more villagers to 
maintain his strength.  Pulajane losses and local resentment over their increasingly 
oppressive presence convinced much of the rural population to cooperate with 
government forces.  Sensing victory, Wood arrived in person on Leyte in early-August 
with two more battalions of infantry.  Despite occasional reversals, the columns of Army 
regulars, scouts, volunteers, and constables kept the pulajanes on the run.  As on Luzon, 
the constant pressure gradually destroyed the insurrection.  By the time a Scout patrol 
captured Ablen on 11 June 1907, the pulajanes no longer posed a serious threat on 
Leyte.88
Pulajane recruiting and raiding on Samar was largely ignored both in Manila and 
by local Army and Constabulary officers who reported only minor activity by small 
bands of fewer than a dozen men and arms.  In 1902, Chaffee made the strikingly 
incongruous observation that “Samar is now as quiet and peaceful as the city of San 
Francisco.”89  The Commission applied no additional pressure to accelerate the slow 
pace of Constabulary recruitment in the province despite the observed increase in 
pulajane activity over the previous year.  One month after assuming responsibility for 
Samar on 15 June 1902, the Constabulary boasted three officers and two constables for 
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the entire province.  By the following June, Samar’s detachments had increased its ranks 
but still remained short of full-strength, claiming 250 of the 300 constables it was 
authorized.  The Constabulary also augmented their forces with roughly 300 Filipino 
scouts.  The Commission accepted the Constabulary’s assurances that these numbers 
were sufficient and that the incidents of violence in the province did not represent any 
kind of general movement.  
However, Bulan had been rebuilding the pulajane ranks since Lukban’s 
surrender in 1902.  By spring 1904, he had gained the cooperation of the principal 
pulajane leaders on Samar: Pedro de la Cruz, Antonio Anugar, and Enrique Dagohob.  
De la Cruz dominated operations above the in the center of the island, near the 
headwaters of the Gandara River, and was the most important insurgent leader to the 
Constabulary prior to the arrival of Enrique Dagohob in 1904.   His raids and ambushes 
exploited the small size of Constabulary patrols and garrisons in the islands interior by 
overwhelming them with superior numbers.  Anugar operated to the east in the Gandara 
River Valley and became Bulan’s deputy.  Dagohob proved to be the more charismatic 
and capable of Bulan’s subordinate leaders and quickly established himself in the 
vicinity of the towns of Oras and Dolores.  Bulan and his leaders benefited from the 
same social schisms and forbidding island terrain as previous insurgents in recruiting 
peasants and evading government patrols.  After more than a year of preparation, he felt 
confident enough to initiate further raids from his mountain strongholds and secure his 
hold on the northern portion of the island, terrorizing towns and villages sympathetic to 
the Commission.  The first of these attacks occurred in February 1904 when 500 
 
60 
pulajanes ambushed a detachment of twenty constables responding to disturbances near 
the town of Borongan, resulting in the loss of two constables and eight rifles.  
Subsequent patrols succeeded in chasing the pulajanes out of the region around the town 
but failed to ascertain the strength of the threat to government control.90  
Bulan, de la Cruz, Anugar, and Dagohob escalated the conflict in the summer of 
1904 with a series of raids against the lowland villages and coastal towns of Samar.  
They aimed to undermine government control directly by destroying the Commission’s 
sanctuaries and thus eliminating its core supporters, as well as possibly hastening the 
realization of their millennial vision.  Pulajanes began their raids in northern Samar in 
July and rapidly overwhelmed much of the Constabulary’s garrison from the fertile 
Gandara Valley to the island’s northern coastline.  Still ignorant of the insurgent 
strength, Allen responded by sending a small detachment from his Manila Battalion 
under the command of Captain Cary I. Crockett to reinforce the Samar garrisons.  
Crockett and his constables made their first contact with a group of pulajanes while 
rushing to the rescue of another detachment on 21 August 1904.  In the engagement, 
Crockett’s men killed forty-one pulajanes and captured four rifles in the process.  
Crockett’s men performed with distinction while facing a larger force, but the incident 
typified the kind of desperate stands that Constabulary forces would fight in the coming 
months.91  
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The renewed fighting over control of Samar invigorated criticism in the United 
States of the Republican Party’s administration of the islands.  Wright, the new 
Philippine civil governor, publicly refuted assertions by Alton B. Parker, a Democratic 
presidential candidate, that insurgents dominated entire districts, claiming that there was 
“not a single band of ladrones operating in the . . . Visayan islands.”92  Members of the 
Commission and Allen defended the viability of American control in the archipelago 
throughout the election year, but reports that hundreds of bolomen roamed Samar instead 
of scattered holdouts raised concerns among them that the Constabulary could not 
control the island.  
Several bloody clashes between small patrols and insurgents in late-1904 
revealed how poorly Allen and Taylor had estimated the state of insurgency in Samar.  In 
November, thirteen Philippine Scouts serving with the Constabulary were massacred at 
Oras.  The following month, a scout company of thirty-seven men, under the command 
of Lieutenant Stephen K. Hayt, was annihilated near Dolores.  The decisive defeat of 
two scout units by pulajanes brought Samar back to the full attention of the Commission 
and provoked commissioners to confront Allen on his sanguine assurances of 
Constabulary control of Samar.  Free to act in November with the election behind him, 
Wright pressured Allen to quell the nascent insurrection in Samar and suggested that the 
Army be used to garrison towns along the coast in order to free up constables and scouts 
for use on expeditions.  Taking personal command of Constabulary forces on Samar, 
Allen acceded to Wright’s suggestion to accept military assistance, and the Army 
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garrisoned the five towns of Llorente, Oras, Taft, Trangunan, and Bulao with U.S. 
infantry on 31 December 1904.93
The resurgence of sectarian violence on Samar in 1904 had taken Allen and the 
Commission by surprise.  Both had accepted the slow pace of Constabulary recruitment 
and training on Samar given the relative calm that followed the Army’s campaign in 
1902.  Samar had about 239 constables, reinforced by a little over 100 Philippine Scouts, 
occupying the entire island in July 1904.  An Army infantry regiment also sat in garrison 
on the western coast, near the Gandara River, but agreements between the Commission 
and the Philippine Division limited the soldiers to serving as a reserve in case of 
emergency.  Constabulary strength was scattered across the island in small detachments 
that lacked the strength to chase Bulan down or even to repel deliberate attacks by his 
forces.  The pulajanes frequently attacked isolated patrols and garrisons with several 
hundred men and always with superior numbers.  Crockett’s small detachment was only 
the first of several waves of reinforcements of constables, scouts, and soldiers sent to 
shore up the Constabulary’s effort to repeat the conquering of Samar from Pablo’s 
forces.  Collectively, they would prove equally inadequate in the following year.94  
The material challenges that continued to plague Allen’s strategy on Samar were 
exemplified by Crockett’s expedition into Samar in January 1905.  Allen ordered 
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Crockett to occupy the remote town of San Ramon in order to create a supply center, 
shield the coastal population from further depredations by the pulajanes, and serve as a 
staging point for punitive expeditions.  When Crockett arrived with three officers and a 
company of 145 constables, he found that the pulajanes had already burned the town and 
scattered or killed its population.95  Interpreting the destruction of San Ramon as 
evidence of a major pulajane stronghold in the vicinity, Crockett immediately set about 
constructing what he termed “Fort Defiance” and sent word to Manila of the town’s 
destruction and for logistical support.  Crockett’s constables suffered greatly and were 
forced to subsist “on coconuts, edible roots, bats . . . and other such things, including two 
large boa constrictors.”96  They probed and waited for further indications of pulajane 
presence or activity.  After nearly a month, Crockett discovered a well-worn trail in the 
jungle while leading a patrol.  His small band followed the trail and encountered a small 
party of pulajanes, killing all three, before turning back to the fort at nightfall.97  
One day after returning to Fort Defiance, Crockett’s company found their enemy.  
On 23 February 1905, two groups of pulajanes struck at the fort in succession.  With 
covering fire from the tree line, sixty pulajanes charged the small rectangular fort with 
flame-lit poles.  The pulajanes leaned the poles on the dry grass and the roof of the fort 
erupted in flames.  Clambering over the walls, the first wave of attackers crashed 
through the burning roof.  Crockett ordered the roof supports cut and the flame-engulfed 
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structure collapsed on the pulajanes.  The final pulajane charge came upon the heels of 
the first.  Fighting with discipline and determination, the constables held the walls of the 
fort in a brawl of rifle volleys and hand-to-hand fighting.  When the black powder smoke 
finally cleared, the constables emerged with light casualties, one killed and four 
wounded, and the pulajanes had melted away with about one hundred dead strewn 
around the fort walls.98
Despite the victory, Crockett’s force remained isolated, with nearly a quarter of 
the men sick and the rest exhausted.99  He organized a party of able-bodied men and set 
out to find a village to obtain food.  His attempt to find a village to obtain supplies was a 
disaster.  Fighting terrain and wildlife, he nearly died and was forced to temporarily 
abandon the wounded at the fort without support or communication.  Crockett’s 
experience highlighted the fact that troops in the interior of Samar could only survive if 
they held a logistical base on the coast and maintained a chain of supply depots.  
The following February, with the Army securing his coastal bases, Allen pressed 
into the island interior with a combined expedition of several hundred constables and 
Filipino scouts from across the Philippines.  He had received reports of a concentration 
of 2,000 pulajanes under Pablo in the Gandara River Valley near the town of San Jose.  
Working informally, Allen coordinated with a battalion from the 12th U.S. Infantry to 
converge on an area suspected of hiding several thousand pulajanes.  Allen divided the 
combined force of 405 constables, scouts, and soldiers into three columns.  160 men 
under Allen would isolate the pulajanes by blocking the main trails leading out of San 
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Jose.  The remaining 245 men would attack the town from the south and east to destroy 
the pulajane force.  The expedition cordoned off the town and struck according to plan, 
but the pulajanes had already evacuated the town, slipping between the deploying 
columns.  Determined, Allen pressed on eastward with a select group of 166 constables 
and scouts to locate the reputed pulajane stronghold in the Maslog Mountains south of 
Oras.  The remainder of the force retired westward.100  Since the Constabulary had 
become cognizant of the pulajane threat in Samar, constables scoured the unsettled 
interior of the island for the infamous place of Pope Pablo and it had risen to the status 
of legend.  Many officers believed it to hide thousands of pulajanes along with the 
infamous Ablen.  Within the Constabulary ranks, it was “the place everybody looks for 
and hopes to God he won’t find.”101  
Allen’s men marched for nearly three days only to discover a fortress that had 
been abandoned for some time near the Dolores River.  Several rotting corpses of 
soldiers and pulajanes provided the sole evidence of previous activity.  The journey 
from San Jose and the Gandara Valley to the Dolores River had taken its toll on the 
expedition.  Reflecting the weakness of the Constabulary in Samar, none of Allen’s 
constables were familiar with the terrain, nor did they have cooperative guides.  
Consequently, instead of a decisive blow, the February expedition had produced little 
more than exhausted, hungry, and diseased troops.  On 22 February, Allen embarked his 
men aboard several rafts on the Dolores River and followed the current for two days to 
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the coast where he boarded a steamer bound for the town of Oras finding Crockett’s 
battered relief party.  In explaining his departure from San Ramon, Crockett asserted that 
the destruction of San Ramon and the ferocity of the attack on Fort Defiance suggested 
that the pulajane attack had originated from Maslog.  The testimony of a young Filipino 
boy, Feliciano, that had escaped captivity under the pulajanes convinced Crockett that 
his forces had been attacked from the pulajanes main encampment.  When he brought 
Feliciano forward to Allen, the boy claimed that he had been in the company of Bulan’s 
war chief, Anugar, at a great fortress and could lead them to its location.  Seeing an 
opportunity to wrestle control from the pulajanes and salvage the Constabulary’s 
prerogative in Samar, Allen once again set about organizing a force to locate and destroy 
Bulan’s stronghold.102  
Allen’s second expedition departed Oras for San Ramon on 28 February.  
Augmented with Crockett’s constables, it sailed to the nearby coastal town of 
Cagamotan and, guided by Feliciano, it set off for the Anugar’s fort.  The column 
followed a trail that followed a gentle slope, interspersed with patches of vegetation and 
jungle canopy.  Cresting the mountain foothills, the expedition struggled through thick 
walls of tall grass.  The waiting pulajanes erupted in a flurry of gunfire and bolo rushes, 
seriously wounding Crockett and several others in the opening exchange.  The column 
responded effectively — firing volleys into the charging bolomen and killing many of 
their leaders early in the battle.  The disciplined ranks and deliberate fire of the column 
broke the momentum of the attack, and the bolomen were driven off with heavy 
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casualties.  After arranging for the wounded, Allen attempted to complete the destruction 
of the attacking pulajane force but to no avail.  He tracked them back to the purported 
location of Maslog only to find yet another fortress, abandoned and demolished.  The 
second expedition in late-February was Allen’s last personal foray into Samar, a tactical 
victory without strategic significance.103  
In the spring of 1905, the Constabulary continued to pursue a strategy of 
scattered garrisons and constant patrolling.  Allen wisely reinforced his garrisons and 
enlarged his patrols to 100 or more to avoid repeating the massacres of 1904, but Bulan 
and the bulk of his forces eluded the Constabulary sweeps and threatened the existence 
of its outposts.  To Allen’s frustration, pulajanes continued to maul small patrols on 
ground previously cleared by his expeditions.  He could neither clear nor hold any 
terrain on Samar with the men and arms the Constabulary possessed.  However, Allen 
still believed in the validity of his strategy and directed the return of constables to their 
home provinces in March 1905.104  He remained convinced that mixing provincial 
detachments was counterproductive and that the Constabulary’s “policy must be to keep 
the minimum forces in the various provinces.”105
After six months of effort, Allen conceded defeat in May 1905 and recommended 
to Governor-General Wright that the Army’s Philippines Division assume the 
pacification effort on Samar.  On 2 June, Wright made the formal request for the Army 
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to pacify those portions of Samar in active unrest.  The failure in Samar was prominently 
reported in June 1905 by the Army and Navy Journal who ran the headline “Philippine 
Constabulary a Failure.”  The Manila Sunday Sun editorial was hardly less caustic: 
“T’ell with the Constabulary.  We will now go to work and establish order in the islands 
with the only real weapon there is – the American Soldier.”106
While succeeding in Leyte, by July 1903, the Constabulary had been 
overwhelmed by pulajanes raiding the lowland towns of Samar.  Their campaigns 
through Samar had succeeded in drawing blood but failed to end religious fanaticism or 
resolve dangerous sectionalism on the island.  With insufficient men and resources, the 
Constabulary could not bring to bear the same force as the Army’s Philippines Division.  
The Constabulary lacked the men to simultaneously conduct substantial expeditions and 
establish outposts to restrict pulajane and ladrone movement.  Several of the mountain 
folk confessed to Taylor that “with bandits on one side and abusive municipal officials 
on the other there was no one they could look to for protection.  They assured him that if 
the constabulary would establish a post in their midst . . . there would be no more trouble 
in that section.”107  
To reinforce Samar’s small garrisons, the Constabulary depended heavily on 
reinforcements of constables and Filipino scouts recruited from distant provinces.  Allen 
could not replicate Taylor’s success in Leyte when so little of the Constabulary’s 
strength was drawn locally.  Constables found themselves fighting an enemy with 
superior numbers and aiding a populace which commonly viewed them as invaders and 
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outsiders.  The advantages of popular support and local knowledge that had mitigated 
their weaknesses in arms and numbers in other provinces were absent in Samar.  The 
only local support the Constabulary could depend upon came from the lowland elites 
whose predatory practices produced much of the antagonism sustaining the pulajane 
movement.  With none of its natural advantages, the Constabulary failed to pacify Samar 
or establish effective civil governance despite Constabulary reinforcements from other 
provinces and the Philippine Scouts.108  
Ironically, it would fall upon the foreign U.S. Army, under Brigadier General 
William H. Carter, to bring a decisive end to the insurgency on Samar.  Carter had 
assumed command of the Army’s Department of the Visayas in February 1904 and 
promptly engaged in a running feud with Allen over the proper role of the Constabulary 
and the use of the Philippine Scouts.  Wright’s call for aid provided Carter with his 
opportunity to act.  On 4 June 1905, a mixed force of soldiers and Filipino scouts struck 
a main encampment at Maslog, killing Enrique Dagohob and ninety-four other 
pulajanes.  The death of Dagohob precipitated a surge in surrenders that accelerated with 
a series of victorious Army expeditions.  Carter supplemented his military campaign 
with a direct assault on the social tensions that had sustained rural discontent on Samar.  
Less dependent upon the cooperation of local presidentes than Allen, Carter took 
measures to halt the exploitation of peasants by the lowland elite, initiating limited land 
reform and supplying food to those in need.  The Army’s combined civil-military 
strategy on Samar had drained the pulajane insurgency of most of its strength by the 
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summer of 1906.  In November, combined Army-Constabulary forces killed de la Cruz, 
and in December, Bulan was mortally wounded when another expedition surprised his 
party while they were encamped.  No other major pulajane leaders remained after 
Bulan’s death, and the Army returned responsibility for Samar to the Constabulary in the 
spring of 1907.109
The Philippine Constabulary ultimately proved a poor substitute for the U.S. 
Army in pacifying the Philippines.  The usage of the Constabulary in the pacification 
campaign in Leyte and Samar squandered its fundamental strength in preventing 
insurgency, defeating banditry at its source, and furthering the objective of creating 
republican political and social institutions.  Instead of complementing the military 
campaign, the Constabulary competed with the Army as the predominant pacification 
force in the post-war Philippines.  Rivalry overruled the imperatives of nation-building 
in dictating the direction of the Constabulary.  Allen asserted, and Taft concurred, that 
the Constabulary needed to fight independently in Samar to fend off criticism from the 
Army and to protect the prerogative of the Commission.  With Taft’s approval, Allen 
focused the Constabulary on pacifying Leyte and Samar and dismissed offers from the 
Army to assume the mission.  As he funneled constables into Samar, constabulary 
stations in other districts gradually lost the initiative, and indications of reemerging 
banditry and insurrection appeared in several provinces.  The official assertion that it 
was “now safe to travel practically throughout the archipelago” became increasingly 
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farcical.110  The inadequacy of the indigenous municipal police in managing local affairs 
became a routine comment in official reports and correspondence between Constabulary 
officers: “Municipal Police are almost without exception, inefficient, undisciplined, 
slouchy and dishonest: little hope can be advanced for their betterment until they are 
placed on an entirely different footing.”111  
When the Constabulary finally refocused on their civil action role, the 
municipalities were weak and rife with corruption.  The previous commitment of the 
Constabulary to a military focus had three immediate consequences.  It squandered the 
limited resources available to the Philippine Commission by creating a poor duplicate of 
the U.S. Army instead of an effective paramilitary police force, it left significantly fewer 
resources for the Commission to create republican institutions at the local level, and it 
curbed progress being made by constables in civic action. 
Even as constables waged war in Samar and Leyte, the Constabulary assumed 
aspects of civil government as the Philippine Commission extended its influence.  In 
1902, the Commission called upon constables “to assist in various works somewhat 
extraneous to the duties laid down for it in the organic act.”112  In June 1904, the 
Constabulary established a separate medical division.  Within a year, they established 
seven hospitals and two wards that served constables and the native population.  The 
medical division reportedly received over one thousand cases in its first year.113  The 
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Constabulary also assumed responsibility for much of the wire services in the 
Philippines.  The Army eagerly passed on the onerous task of maintaining those services.  
Remarkably, despite distractions, the constables made significant headway in improving 
and maintaining communications across the islands.  From June 1903 to June 1904, the 
miles of telegraph lines quadrupled, the number of telegraph stations nearly tripled, and 
the number of working telephones outside of the Manila area more than doubled.114  
Constables also ran the mail in much of the country, the remote areas in particular, with 
several officers serving as postmasters.  Across the islands, they contained epidemic 
outbreaks and enforced sanitary laws.  They guarded jails and escorted prisoners.  Their 
commissary system gained a reputation for efficiency, servicing both the civil 
administration and themselves.115  
The contribution of the Constabulary went far beyond simple public works 
projects.  Officers learned that their success required guiding the governance of their 
localities and the reshaping of Filipino society.  They understood better than most the 
challenge of establishing a democratic civil society.  However, attempting to fight the 
military campaigns with fewer resources than the Army stalled their civic efforts and 
diverted men and pesos.  As constables bled fighting the pulajanes, the municipal 
government and police maintained the same culture of graft unfettered.  
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The Constabulary could not effectively conduct pacification and civil action 
simultaneously.  A senior officer asserted that the relative successes of the Constabulary 
were only the result of heroic efforts by “a few very high grade men who have, during 
the past few years performed feats of supererogation, de facto and also de jure by means 
of persuasion, tact and personal magnetism.”  By such effort, many officers made some 
headway in stemming corruption and implementing forms of social change.116   
Constabulary Lieutenant Colonel John R. White observed in 1911 that the 
military organization and focus of the Constabulary produced real costs to the 
organization and to the American civil administration.  The time and resources spent 
honing military drill and conducting expeditions reduced their proficiency in their core 
functions of police and civil work.  White noted that when a compromise must be made 
“generally speaking it is the police work which has been sacrificed to the military 
features, in an effort to emulate the Philippine Scouts.”117   The petty rivalry with the 
Scouts and the Army infected the Philippine Commission and the senior leaders of the 
Constabulary, many of whom were ambitious Regular Army officers.  The drift in focus 
cost the Constabulary where it could have contributed most.  The particular demands of 
both drill and expeditions required a size force that did not fit the specific demands of 
policing and civil action.  Large companies and ad hoc battalions drained the budget and 
forced wages and subsistence provisions down.  White observed that his constables 
never ate better than his prisoners at Iwahig Penal Colony and that low wages attracted 
few men of dedication and competence.  White complained that on “a muchacho’s, or 
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less than a muchacho’s pay, a muchacho quality is obtained which cannot be taught the 
duties of a peace officer or depended on for anything but routine and parrot-like 
work.”118  The delicate work of constables in towns had to be closely monitored by 
quality officers and non-commissioned officers, a body of men always in short supply. 
Nevertheless, the militarization of the Constabulary did allow it to survive its 
formative years and provided the Commission with the means to establish its authority 
over the Philippine archipelago.  Conditions in the provinces dictated that constables be 
trained and equipped as paramilitary troops.  In this task, Allen and his officers 
accomplished great feats of organization and planning to establish the Constabulary 
within a year against the constraints of limited funds and equipment.  With few 
exceptions, the founding cohort of officers selected by Allen created disciplined units 
that fought well against fierce enemies while armed with obsolescent weapons and often 
away from their home provinces. 
Yet, the development of constables as soldiers ultimately fell short of providing 
the Commission with the force necessary to complete the pacification of the Philippines 
and it came at a cost to the future of the islands as a republic.  The Constabulary could 
not have completed the pacification of any of the districts without the substantial 
reinforcements provided by the Army.  Soldiers and scouts provided the well-equipped 
numbers that made the decisive difference in several campaigns and provided the 
flexibility necessary to keep pacified provinces under control.  In the case of Samar, the 
Army had to assume the lead before that province could be brought under control.  
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When the Constabulary relieved the Army of its responsibilities in Samar and in the 
Moro provinces, its constables had taken on the identity of soldiers who fought 
dissenters as foreign enemies of the state, not of national policemen who enforced the 
law.   
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CHAPTER IV 
THE MILITARIZATION OF THE GENDARMERIE 
 
 
In 1915, the United States embarked on a nineteen-year occupation of the Haitian 
Republic.  After a brief pacification campaign, the U.S. Marines would quickly establish 
an indigenous constabulary to maintain order and enforce centralized authority from 
Port-au-Prince.  Under the leadership of a solid group of marine officers, the Haitian 
constabulary extended unprecedented central government authority and efficiency in 
Haiti’s history as an independent nation.  By 1916, brigandage and insurrection had 
subsided into occasional small raids that constituted little threat to government control.  
Although Haitian constables were trained according to the Marines’ own drill manuals, 
tactical and technical competence remained weak until a nationalist uprising encouraged 
the rapid militarization of Haiti’s constabulary. The entrenchment of the constables 
under the Marines as a domestic military force would significantly shape their future role 
in the development of Haiti as a nation. 
The Caribbean region took on greater strategic significance for the United States 
in the early-1900s.  The outbreak of the First World War raised concerns that the Great 
Powers coveted defendable ports in the Caribbean Sea and sought control over the 
Panama Canal.  President Woodrow Wilson feared that a European power, Germany in 
particular, would use protection of foreign interests and collection of debt payments 
from the chronically unstable regimes of the region as a pretext for occupation. 
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American leaders worried about the island of Hispaniola in particular.  The island was 
divided between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Each nation had suitable locations 
for naval bases that could facilitate control of the Windward and Mona Passages 
between the Caribbean and South Atlantic Seas.  To deny these locations to European 
powers, the U.S. would intervene repeatedly in the internal affairs of Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic during the first decade and a half of the twentieth century, but Haiti 
would be the first to be completely occupied by American forces.119
Haiti covers nearly 28,000 square miles on the western third of Hispaniola, but 
only a small percentage of the land is naturally arable.  Most of Haiti consists of 
mountainous terrain that rises eastward from the coastal plains and valleys. The elevated 
ground in the east limits the flow of westward trade winds, causing occasional droughts, 
and tropical air from the west frequently inundates Haiti with heavy rain fall, producing 
floods and severe soil erosion. The paucity of cultivated land and weather extremes 
produced a constant battle between lowland villagers and mountain rebels, known as 
cacos, over subsistence crops as well as over control of customs revenues passing 
through the port cities of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien.120
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The events leading directly to occupation began when Vilbrun Guillaume Sam 
forcibly seized power in Haiti with the aid of a caco army on 4 March 1915.  
Historically, caco armies had determined the lifespan of Haitian presidents in office.  
When a president fell out of favor, the cacos would sponsor a political rival and lead a 
coup to install a new president.121  Wilson worried that Sam’s seizure of power would 
provide a justification for military action by European creditor nations.  He believed that 
American direction of the Haitian government provided the only realistic solution for 
ending both persistent regional instability and the threat of European involvement.  
Wilson’s Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, sent a diplomatic commission to 
Haiti in April 1915 that called on the Haitian government to settle the multitude of 
foreign claims against it, to guarantee the protection of foreign interests, to American 
management of the Haitian national bank, to U.S. control of Haitian customs, and to 
barring foreign possession of the undeveloped harbor at Mole St. Nicolas.122  
Although Sam refused the American terms, political rivals circulated rumors that 
he had accepted them.  Public outrage over the alleged concession spawned a rebellion 
in June under the leadership of the unstable but charismatic Ronsalvo Bobo.  A caco 
army loyal to Bobo seized the port town of Cap Haïtien and threatened to take Port-au-
Prince.  On 27 July, cacos stormed a prison in the capital holding political prisoners. 
Panicked, the prison commander, Oscar Etienne, executed 167 of the inmates, many of 
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whom were members of the Haitian elite.  The ensuing outrage forced Sam and Etienne 
to take refuge in two of the foreign legations.  Rioting Haitians stormed the consulates 
and brutally killed both men, parading their dismembered remains through the streets.123
A small detachment of U.S. Marines had arrived in Port-au-Prince more than two 
weeks before the coup to protect an American field radio station, but on 28 July, an 
additional 330 marines and sailors under Rear Admiral William B. Caperton arrived to 
establish control of the city.  Between 1913 and 1915, marines had landed in Haiti 
thirteen times in response to the recurring instability, and many Haitians assumed that 
the landing force would limit its presence to Port-au-Prince and immediately depart after 
imposing order.  Instead, Wilson used Sam’s gruesome death as an opportunity to 
implement his bolder vision for imposing responsible government on Haiti.  At the 
direction of the new Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, the Navy reinforced the initial 
landing party with the 1st Marine Brigade consisting of two regiments, an artillery 
battalion, and a signal company under the command of Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller 
on 15 August.124  
By September 1915, the marine brigade had easily secured the principal port 
cities of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien as well as the coastal region with the help of the 
Navy.  However, the Wilson Administration still did not have a thoroughly developed 
plan for administering Haiti.  The opportunistic landing of the first expeditionary force 
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preceded a month of muddling through key issues, such as identifying strategic aims and 
whether to retain the Haitian government in office or replace it with military governor.  
It was not until the end of that month that the administration settled upon establishing a 
virtual protectorate on the basis of a joint treaty with the existing Haitian government.125  
The principal military officers on the island, Caperton and Waller, attempted to 
overcome the lack of specific guidance by independently developing strategy, but, 
without deliberate oversight, they occasionally contradicted the approach envisioned by 
the Wilson Administration.  Caperton attempted to win Haitian acceptance of the U.S. 
occupation by applying a conciliatory tone.  The Haitian government was struggling to 
maintain any semblance of legitimacy while under foreign occupation, unable to pay its 
civil servants or dole out patronage.  Caperton promised Haitian senators U.S. loans to 
alleviate their government’s fiscal problems and quell their opposition to the proposed 
treaty, requesting $1.5 million through the State Department.  However, American 
diplomats in Washington disputed Caperton’s financial figures and his assessment of the 
Haitian government’s situation.  Arthur B. Blanchard, the U.S. chargé d’affairs in Haiti, 
voiced his support of the admiral’s request, but Caperton and Blanchard only succeeded 
in obtaining a fraction of the funds requested.  The amount allowed Haiti to pay some 
salaries but the government was also forced to discharge many other civil servants into 
unemployment.126
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Caperton and Waller shared a frustration with the contradiction of maintaining 
the form and appearance of Haitian sovereignty while violating Haiti’s sovereign 
prerogatives.  Waller, in particular, had little patience with diplomatic wrangling.  He 
advocated bypassing the Haitian elite and establishing an American-run military 
government.  To their credit, both officers succeeded in providing the United States with 
the necessary leverage in negotiation by pressuring Haitian politicians while not 
provoking an uprising, balancing coercion with persuasion.  Both officers understood 
that Wilson wanted an intervention by nominal consent even if it was obtained by 
military intimidation.  Waller recognized that a violent clash with revolutionaries or 
bandits would complicate the treaty negotiations between Washington and the presiding 
Haitian government.   Consequently, he kept his marines under tight rein despite the 
occasional provocation by caco insurgents.  He limited military activity to the coastal 
areas that the cacos had already ceded to the marines and undertook no punitive 
expeditions.  Waller also bided his time by developing plans and lobbying friends in 
Washington, such as the ascendant Colonel John A. Lejeune, to shape the treaty 
provisions favorably toward a strong military authority in Haiti.  On 16 September 1915, 
Philippe Sudre Dartiguanave, President of Haiti, signed the final treaty agreement.   
Among the treaty’s provisions was an American-led constabulary, the 
Gendarmerie, to constitute the sole armed force in Haiti.127  The Haitian Gendarmerie 
was to be “under the direction of the Haitian Government, have supervision and control 
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of arms and ammunition, military supplies, and traffic therein, throughout the 
country.”128  A supplementary agreement the following August specified the gendarmes 
would have “full power to preserve domestic peace, the security of individual rights, and 
the full observance of the provisions of the Treaty.”129  Nowhere in the treaty was a hint 
of the sweeping duties and functions the gendarmes would perform during the nearly 
two decades of American occupation. 
With the treaty signed, Waller felt free to pursue the recalcitrant Haitians that had 
retreated to several mountain strongholds when marines occupied the coastal towns.  The 
cacos lacked sufficient quantities of working firearms to equip most of their men and 
relied upon mass charges with machetes.  In addition, many of the caco leaders seemed 
more interested in fighting for favorable terms of settlement than in fighting a protracted 
war for domination against better equipped U.S. force.  Waller exploited both 
vulnerabilities of the caco resistance.  He eliminated the most prominent members of the 
caco leadership using a combination of bribery, martial law, and punitive expeditions.  
By December 1915, Waller’s marines had pacified most of the Haitian countryside and 
the principal towns.  The climactic battle was led by Major Smedley D. Butler, future 
chief of the Haitian constabulary, at a caco stronghold near Cap Haïtien called Fort 
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Rivière.  It came several months after Waller had negotiated the surrender of several 
caco generals and was the last major battle of the Marine pacification campaign.130
Waller did not bother waiting for the Haitian National Assembly to ratify the 
treaty or the protocol specifying the status and duties of the constabulary before 
installing the first chief of the constabulary and recruiting the first cohort of gendarme 
officers.131  Butler shared Waller’s sentiments: “This wretched Government absolutely 
refuses to sign any agreement which may deprive them of their graft.”132  Publicly, he 
defended expanding the Gendarmerie as the only viable path to national improvement 
for the Haitian people: “the Gendarmerie will not be a success without the control of the 
public utilities.”  Privately, Butler continued to view public improvements primarily 
through the lens of military utility and necessity.  Obligated by treaty to cooperate with 
Haiti’s president and ministers, Waller and Butler viewed the Gendarmerie as their only 
assurance that their efforts would bear any fruit for the common Haitian and any promise 
of an end to the occupation.133  
Forced to accept nominal Haitian sovereignty, Waller prescribed most of the 
functions he had recommended for a military regime to the Gendarmerie.  It was an 
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expanded role that burdened it with functions far exceeding that of an urban or rural 
guard.  In February 1916, Waller outlined his twenty functions for the gendarmes to 
perform.  Collectively, they reflected Waller’s broader vision for the Gendarmerie as a 
temporary civil service bureaucracy and went far beyond what the treaty agreement 
specified.  He proposed a range of duties that ranged from sanitation enforcement to 
census-taking.  The Haitian constabulary would function as a military government and 
interact with the Haitian government as a formality.134  
 Waller called upon Butler to organize and lead this instrument of U.S. state-
building.  Twice awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, Butler was an adept 
organizer and charismatic leader.135  After less than a year, he established a constabulary 
force of 120 officers and approximately 2,600 gendarmes from a token force of about 
500 Haitians that the Marines had organized locally in 1915.  Unlike Allen in his time 
with the Philippine Constabulary, Butler did not face either active or passive resistance 
from the senior military commander in country during his tenure.  From the beginning, 
the Marine brigade and Gendarmerie operated cooperatively, serving complementary 
functions.  Waller invested heavily in establishing the constabulary.  Butler noted that in 
selecting the initial cohort of Gendarmerie officers Waller had “contributed the pick of 
the Marines.  I have never found their equal anywhere in the United States service.  
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Many of them learned to speak Creole fluently.”  He proudly observed that they worked 
“like Trojans to lick the Gendarmerie into shape.”136
Although thousands of Haitians were already members of the Haitian military 
and police forces, Waller and Butler dismissed the idea of using them for the 
Gendarmerie.  They believed that eliminating the old military and security forces of 
Haiti would help to erase the memory of abuses committed by the Gendarmerie’s 
predecessors.  They also perceived these forces as hopelessly demoralized and defeatist.  
Select members of the Haitian military and police were recruited by the Gendarmerie, 
but they entered as basic recruits and trained alongside green volunteers according to the 
Marine drill regulation.137  With regular pay, good clothing, and meals everyday, the 
Gendarmerie quickly grew in popularity with the local population and recruiting soared.  
By October 1916, the Gendarmerie had reached its full authorized strength of 2,533.138
The Gendarmerie organized on a territorial basis with gendarmes recruited from 
their home districts to serve in units based in those localities, reflecting the favored 
approach of previous American constabularies in the Philippines and Cuba.  The U.S. 
divided the country into three geographical departments.  The Department of the Cape 
included the northern peninsula eastward to the border with the Dominican Republic.  
The Department of Cayes covered the southern peninsula.  The Department of Port-au-
Prince included the capital city and a narrow stretch of territory between the two 
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peninsulas, bounded by the towns of Thomonde to the north and Leogane to the south.  
The Gendarmerie further subdivided the departments into districts and sub-districts, each 
centered on a town.  Districts were each allotted one gendarme company.   Although 
administered as a regiment, the companies operated as independent units in their 
respective districts in performing their assigned duties, their recruitment and their 
training.139
The effort to teach poor and illiterate Haitians the essential skills and knowledge 
for gendarmes was initially decentralized and of uneven quality.  While the gendarme 
officers were among the best in the 1st Marine Brigade, they were severely challenged by 
the task of training the Gendarmerie from the foundations across a language barrier.  The 
Marines translated their drill manual into French for training.  However, officers 
discovered that “while French is the official language of Haiti, Creole is the common 
language and was universally spoken by the new recruits.”  The officers adjusted their 
training methods by focusing on simple commands and teaching trainees tasks by 
imitation. They also focused on a limited range of simple duties, such as urban patrols 
and manning outposts.  The improvised training program also fell short of achieving the 
ambitious cultural transformation Butler had hoped to achieve by building the 
Gendarmerie from the foundations.  The habit of petty abuses, carried over from 
previous government forces, persisted throughout the Gendarmerie’s history.140
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 In addition to language barriers, the gendarmes had not yet gained the full trust of 
their officers.  Issued Krag-Jörgensen rifles, few of them were trained on proper firing 
technique.  In one instance, a rifle squad of ten effectives, with the eleventh firing a 
blank cartridge, managed to hit the condemned prisoner with only one round from thirty 
feet.  The immediate response was to reduce the distance to fifteen feet.  Gendarmerie 
officers understood the limited capabilities of their gendarmes, but they demonstrated 
little concern.  Instead, they congratulated themselves on their progress: “The Garde in 
two short years had emerged from a mob of barefoot, ragged peasants, armed with 
obsolete Russian rifles, into a fairly well equipped and disciplined force of 
approximately 2,500 officers and men.”141  Engagements with cacos from the fall of 
1918 into 1919 revealed this assessment to be overoptimistic.142
Although the documentary evidence seems far from conclusive, the Gendarmerie 
officers’ sanguine estimation of their men likely stemmed from the apparent lack of 
military opposition to the occupation.  Gendarmerie leaders believed that the cacos had 
been removed as a force in Haitian affairs by the Marines’ 1915 pacification campaign.  
Through 1917, the low level of hostile activity reinforced their perception.  Caco raids 
during those two years were small in scale and sporadic.  Butler and other gendarme 
officers also assumed that Haitian peasants would support them against the caco 
chieftains who allegedly exploited them.  Gendarmerie officers mentally divided rural 
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Haitians into discrete categories of cooperative peasants and parasitic banditry.  By 
casting all cacos as bandits, the Gendarmerie and Marines revealed their ignorance of 
the indigenous opposition and the potential support available to any charismatic caco 
leader that might arise.143
The Gendarmerie’s weaknesses became obvious during resurgence in caco 
activity between 1918 and 1922.  Instead of militarizing, as the Philippine Constabulary 
had done, the Gendarmerie assumed a remarkable proportion of the functions of 
government.  One U.S. official observed that gendarme officers “were veritable 
potentates in their respective districts.”144  Gendarmerie officers supervised elections 
and district commanders were encouraged to hold town meetings to build popular 
support for the measures and to explain the new constitution and voting procedures.  One 
dispatch even recommended considering an American-style barbecue to increase 
participation.  Gendarme hospitals and wards provided medical care to the population, as 
well as the gendarmes.  Officers disbursed pay to the civil servants, such as teachers.  
They enforced sanitary regulations and contained epidemic outbreaks.  Many officers 
were assigned double duty as Communal Advisors in an effort to reduce graft at the local 
level. 
The Gendarmerie’s approach to elevating Haiti’s condition through economic 
improvement lacked the necessary funding to support many of the necessary 
infrastructure projects.  Preoccupied with European problems, the Wilson 
Administration gave little attention to Haiti.  As a result, Butler was forced to scrounge 
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for resources. Bypassing his superiors, Butler succeeded in appropriating the services of 
several specialists from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to increase the productivity 
of Haitian fields, many of which had lay fallow because of caco raids.  But the 
specialists proved of little worth   They were unfamiliar with the local crop varieties and 
soil type and the Gendarmerie lacked the wherewithal to implement their 
recommendations.145  
The Gendarmerie’s reestablishment of the corvée, or drafted road labor, was 
another attempt to spur economic prosperity through infrastructure projects.  Short on 
funds, the Haitian government could not afford paid labor to improve and maintain a 
national road network.  Butler and Colonel Eli K. Cole, Waller’s replacement, believed a 
road network capable of supporting vehicle traffic was necessary to create a unified 
nation and to facilitate Haiti’s economic development.  It would also allow gendarmes 
and marines to more effectively reach the interior of the nation and eliminate the last 
caco holdouts.  Begun in 1917, the road project was accepted grudgingly by the Haitian 
population. Employing 6,000 Haitians, the corvée initially made significant progress 
without triggering a general revolt.  Labor parties only improved and maintained roads 
within their home regions and only for short durations.   
The labor program’s resemblance to slavery rankled the Haitian peasantry and 
their toleration of the corvée masked their seething resentment.  The heavy-handed 
conduct of the Gendarmerie towards the workers only aggravated the problem.  The 
gendarmes, themselves former peasants, persistently abused their authority over laborers 
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while enforcing the corvée.  A U.S. naval investigation later found that Haitians had 
been tied together as chain gangs, and many had been allegedly shot wantonly by their 
gendarme guards.  One Haitian testified before the U.S. Senate that his son had been 
physically pulled from his home by a gendarme detail to work on the corvée, beaten over 
the head, and never returned home.   
Resentment developed into open insurrection after gendarmes began forcing 
drafted laborers to work in remote areas for extended periods.  By 1918, the road 
network had expanded beyond the coastal towns and required construction in the 
highlands to unify the system.  However, the mountain regions were too sparsely 
populated to support the arduous task of carving roads.  Gendarmerie Colonel Alexander 
S. Williams resorted to drafting workers from the lowland population to support the 
project.146
As civic work progressed, most American officers saw little reason for urgency 
in accelerating or improving gendarme training from 1915 to 1918.  By the end of 1915, 
virtually all armed resistance from the caco insurgency had been quelled, and the 
Marines had retired to consolidated garrisons in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien on the 
coast as a reserve.147  In the intervening years, from 1916 to 1918, the gendarmes 
participated in numerous minor engagements against small groups of bandits, led by 
opportunists who tried to claim the mantle of caco leadership.   
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In late 1918, while serving a five-year sentence for leading a raid against a 
gendarme garrison, Peralte escaped from his guards into the mountainous jungle of 
northern Haiti.  He rapidly organized a force and immediately began raids in the 
northern District of the Cape.  The Gendarmerie had already been drafting corvée 
laborers to work beyond their home areas, and Haitian resentment over the forced labor 
practice fueled Peralte’s bandit recruitment.  Riding on pent up animosity, he quickly 
amassed a force of bandits and a network of supporters and part-time volunteers.  As one 
Marine later recalled, “Soon by the throbbing signal drums the news was being relayed 
from mountain to mountain in the Department of the North that a mighty general, a 
second Dessalines, was raising an army that would shortly drive the ‘Blancs’ into the 
sea, and great would be the pillage and loot to the followers of General 
Charlemagne.”148
The Marine brigade commander in 1919 was Brigadier General Albertus W. 
Catlin, who had just returned from the Western Front in Europe and “was inclined to 
believe that the problem was properly one for the Garde to solve, without the help of 
God and a few marines.”149  Likewise the Gendarmerie leaders did not take Peralte’s 
activities seriously.  The three years of relative peace led Catlin and others to believe 
that the worst was long behind them.  The Gendarmerie’s leaders were also not of the 
same caliber as those Waller had handpicked for Butler in 1915.  Most of the better 
officers departed for the American Expeditionary Force and did not return before the 
caco uprising. 
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Unmolested, Peralte was able to build up his contingent into a small army of 
several thousand insurgents and sympathizers.  The force lacked adequate arms and 
ammunition, but it possessed mobility, physically strong individuals, and the ability to 
sustain operations on limited resources.  Peralte divided his forces into independent 
bands, or “detachments,” of thirty to fifty men each.  The detachments were further sub-
divided into ten to fifteen man “divisions” led by chiefs and sub-chiefs.  Under Peralte’s 
charismatic leadership, the pace of caco expansion was rapid.  By the fall of 1918, caco 
detachments roamed Haiti from the northern mountains southward into the 
agriculturally-rich Artibonite Valley.  Peralte assigned the fertile southern region to one 
of his more capable chiefs, Benoit Betraville.150
Colonel Walter N. Hill, commanding the Department of Port-au-Prince, believed 
the rumors of caco activity were more credible than did Colonel Alexander S. Williams, 
Butler’s interim replacement as chief, or the other department chiefs.  Catlin remained 
unconvinced that the bandits represented a significant threat.  However, Hill followed 
his instincts and dispatched Gendarmerie Major John A. Gray to Mirebalais, the 
principal town of the Artibonite Valley, to investigate rumors of caco activity in that 
important region.  To his chagrin, Gray discovered that Mirebalais’s young garrison 
commander had noted increased caco activity, but he had refrained from reporting it 
because “he was afraid that he might be regarded as a scaremonger.”151
Native informants had reported to the lieutenant that about two hundred cacos 
were encamped at an old fortification called Boucan Carré, about ten miles northwest of 
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Mirebalais under the leadership of Betraville.  Gray submitted a request to the 
department headquarters in Port-au-Prince for a machine gun to reinforce his position in 
Mirebalais.  Hill responded by personally leading a detachment of thirty gendarmes, a 
captain, a lieutenant and the requested machine gun in tow.  Hill was briefed on the 
native reports upon his arrival and decided to attack the caco camp that night.  
The Boucan Carré fort was once part of the line of French outposts in the valley.  
It rested on a stone platform overlooking the Boucan Carré River thirty feet below on a 
near-vertical drop.  Several trails merged within a few yards of the southern wall of the 
fort, including a main trail leading to Mirebalais.  Moving by night, Hill’s detachment 
came upon a voodoo ceremonial at around 2 a.m.  The cacos were dancing about an 
enormous bonfire and had not posted any guards.  Gray and the garrison commander led 
two wings of fifteen men each and moved into position on the north and west sides of 
the fort.  The remaining ten gendarmes and the machine gun moved to the south as the 
ambush element under Hill.  
A chance contact with bandits in the tree line by one of the lieutenant’s 
gendarmes tripped off the attack prematurely.  Having lost the element of surprise, the 
gendarmes opened fire less than two hundred yards from the camp of stunned cacos.  In 
the confusion, several gendarmes crossed in front of the machine gun position.  Hill, 
frustrated, held his fire and the attack devolved into a melee with gendarmes firing 
wildly and cacos scattering.  Despite the large number of cacos in concentration, the 
number of enemy killed totaled only nineteen.  The gendarmes suffered no fatalities.  
The result of the raid was the scattering of caco forces and the lowering of Betraville’s 
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prestige.  Still, the ineffectiveness of gendarme marksmanship was galling.  “The 
gendarmes, through no fault of their own, could not employ aimed fire.  They fired their 
Krag carbines from the hip, or held them with hands grasping the comb of the stock and 
both arms extended, then closed their eyes and pulled the trigger.”152  Hill’s 
disappointment was palpable.  The number of enemy killed closely matched the number 
of rounds expended by the officers.  Most of the cacos had escaped along with their 
leader.  
Although the battle at Boucan Carré failed to eliminate Betraville’s forces in 
central Haiti, it awakened the Gendarmerie leadership and Catlin to the size of the caco 
threat.  In March, Williams requested the active support of the 1st Marine Brigade in 
quelling the budding insurgency.  Catlin, still underestimating the size of his enemy, 
responded with only six companies of marines to augment gendarme patrols in the 
interior of the country, north and east of Port-au-Prince.  The combined marine-
gendarme force inflicted heavy losses on caco forces, but Peralte remained undeterred 
and continued to command a sizeable army.  In October 1919, he felt confident enough 
to challenge control of Port-au-Prince.  His assault on the city with 300 cacos was 
repulsed, but the audacity of the attack and the level of popular support that came out in 
support of the caco leader shocked U.S. leaders into taking a more deliberate approach 
to ending the uprising. 
As the Marines and Gendarmerie began intensifying their efforts, they scored 
their first major victory through the creative deceptions of gendarme Captain Herman H. 
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Hanneken.  Less than a month after the October attack, Peralte had established a 
stronghold named Fort Capois in Hanneken’s district of Grand Rivière du Nord after his 
defeat outside of Port-au-Prince with intentions of raiding towns in the district.  
Discovering Peralte’s scheme through informants, the gendarme officer convinced a 
prominent local Haitian, Jean B. Conze, to work his way into Peralte’s confidence.  
Conze proved himself to be an able and courageous informant, meeting with Hanneken 
routinely to pass on information and receive instructions.  Together, the gendarme 
officer and his agent convinced Peralte and his deputies that the district garrison was 
unprepared to repel any determined assault.  Seeking redemption from the Port-au-
Prince debacle, Peralte developed plans to take the Gendarmerie garrison.  In 
preparation, several hundred cacos from throughout the region began gathering at the 
stronghold on 26 October 1919.153
As the caco force assembled, gendarme Colonel James J. Meade secretly 
reinforced Hanneken’s garrison under the cover of night on 30 October.  With the arrival 
of Meade’s reinforcements, Hanneken and gendarme First Lieutenant William R. Button 
led a detachment of eighteen gendarmes, all in local dress, toward Peralte’s stronghold.  
He planned to ambush the caco column near the town of Mazare as it advanced towards 
the Gendarmerie garrison in hopes of capturing Peralte.  However, Peralte abruptly 
abandoned his stated plans and ordered Conze to lead the column into Grand Rivière in 
his stead.  Private Jean E. Francois, a gendarme that had infiltrated with Conze, rushed 
from Fort Capois to inform Hanneken.  Determined to capture Peralte, the Gendarmerie 
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captain continued his penchant for covert operations and improvised a plan to infiltrate 
the stronghold with his detachment and seize the caco leader.  Improbably, the two 
American officers and their men, with Francois as their guide, managed to pass by five 
sets of caco sentries without being discovered.  Once in the main camp, the well-armed 
detachment overwhelmed Peralte’s personal guard and Hanneken killed Peralte with two 
pistol rounds to the chest.  At Grand Rivière, the reinforced garrison easily repulsed the 
caco attack and the survivors fled back to the temporary refuge of Fort Capois.154
Hanneken mobilized his garrison for a combined attack to eliminate the last caco 
holdouts.  On the morning of 2 November, his reinforced gendarme company 
maneuvered to attack along the northern and southern approaches to the caco fort, 
expecting the marine detachment to trap the cacos from the east and west.  Once again, 
Hanneken’s plans came undone near the moment of execution.  Caco lookouts spotted 
the gendarmes as dawn broke, and the promised marine reinforcements were nowhere to 
be seen.  Not willing to wait, the Gendarmerie captain ordered the attack to proceed with 
the western and eastern avenues left open.  The gendarmes demonstrated their mettle 
when well led, advancing under constant rifle and cannon fire over 100 yards of open 
ground.  As the gendarmes neared the fortress walls, the caco defense disintegrated, and 
much of the garrison began to flee through the unguarded east and west walls.  After 
razing Fort Capois, Hanneken pursued the fleeing cacos and established a cordon with 
his marine detachment, which had finally arrived, to prevent them from joining 
Betraville in the Department of Port-au-Prince.  On 8 November 1919, the combined 
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gendarme-marine force succeeded in cornering the caco survivors, taking nearly 300 of 
them prisoner.155
Betraville remained a threat to towns in the Department of Port-au-Prince until 
January 1920 when he recklessly charged the defenses of Port-au-Prince with 
approximately 400 men.  Marine and Gendarmerie defenders repulsed the attack with 
heavy losses to Betraville’s forces.  Thereafter, the caco chief was preoccupied with 
dodging Hill’s gendarmes until a chance contact with a gendarme patrol, under the 
command of gendarme Captain Jesse L. Perkins, caught up with the caco chief on 18 
May 1920 in the mountains northeast of Port-au-Prince near the town of Las Cahobas.  
Perkins’s men encountered a lookout position consisting of five cacos and pursued them 
after exchanging rifle fire when they came upon a caco encampment where Betraville 
was hiding.  In the ensuing fight, the caco chief was killed, eliminating the last caco 
leader with the ability to hold the loyalties of the subordinate chiefs.  In the wake of 
Betraville’s death, the uprising quickly disintegrated under the sustained pressure of 
gendarme-marine patrols. 
The campaign against Peralte and Betraville from 1919 to 1921 represented an 
interruption to an institutional history characterized more by civil administration duty 
than military action.  The cacos of the time were poorly armed and divided.  The 
gendarmes were comparatively better disciplined and often courageous when called 
upon in action: there are many accounts of gendarmes recovering the body of a fallen 
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officer or shielding their officers from caco fire.156  Even so, the Gendarmerie could not 
control the unrest they had generated.  Without greater support and guidance from the 
U.S., the Gendarmerie overextended itself in performing the role of a military 
government and attempting to fulfill every promise of the occupation.  In resurrecting 
the corvée, Butler had also planted the seeds of uprising just as the quality of the 
Gendarmerie’s leadership declined dramatically.  Few Haitians had been commissioned 
as gendarme officers, and many of the Gendarmerie’s most competent American officers 
had departed to join the American Expeditionary Forces by 1919, including Butler.157  
The initial cohort of officers was replaced by less experienced, less competent, and less 
culturally acclimated marine and naval officers.  As a result, the Gendarmerie 
encountered the caco uprising confused and physically unable to quell the turmoil it had 
created. 
The 1st Marine Brigade and Gendarmerie did successfully complete a second 
U.S. pacification campaign, defeating the cacos handily, but their victory could not 
rescue the moribund occupation.  The violence of the uprising raised skepticism towards 
the American mission in Haiti and wounded American political will to continue the 
effort.  The altruistic claims of the occupation’s proponents could no longer mask Haiti’s 
persistent problems after the cacos uprising, and investors largely abandoned any hopes 
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of turning a profit in the Haitian Republic.  In the end, the pacification had left over two 
thousand Haitian casualties and provoked an extended Congressional inquiry.158  
By 1921, the historical moment for reforming Haiti had passed.  The remaining 
years consisted of gradually turning over all affairs of government to the Haitians.  
Political pressure in the U.S. and abroad for the handover of all governmental affairs to 
Haitians mounted, and several changes were made in the directing of the occupation.  
The State Department assumed the lead from the Navy Department in 1924, and a high 
commissioner was appointed to work with Haiti’s president and oversee U.S forces in 
the republic.  Advocates of the intervention succeeded in limiting the Haitianization of 
the occupation to a stately pace despite scandals of prisoner abuses and atrocities at the 
hands of some marines and gendarmes.  
However, the slow pace of transition abruptly accelerated in 1929 when rioters 
lashed out over the suspension of elections by the Haitian president, Louis Borno, and 
the increasing power of the State Department-run civilian bureaucracy in Haiti.  The 
protest movement overwhelmed the Gendarmerie, and the U.S. high commissioner 
responded by reinforcing them with several marine detachments and declaring martial 
law.  Neither the reinforcements nor the imposition of strict government controls quelled 
the violence.  On 6 December 1929, a gathering of 1,500 Haitians flooded the streets of 
Cayes, a Haitian town located on the south coast.  Armed, the crowd challenged the 
marine detachment dispatched to stop them.  In the confusion, several marines fired into 
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the mob and killed at least fifty of the protestors.  Public outrage in the U.S. triggered 
another inquiry into the conduct of the occupation which called for the rapid transition of 
all aspects of the occupation to Haitian leadership, including the Gendarmerie.159
In the aftermath of the Cayes Incident, Gendarmerie officers were rushed to 
transfer control to a young Haitian officer corps, only recently commissioned.  Not 
surprisingly, their belated efforts to implement Waller’s recommendations in 1915 to 
focus on establishing a professional cadre of Haitian officers failed.  The Gendarmerie 
began the process too late for the Marines to mature a cohort of leaders who could resist 
the corruption of the political system and the temptation to abuse their power.  Instead of 
protecting Haitian society, the discipline and dominance of the gendarmes would come 
to serve the tyrannical whims of Francois Duvalier.160
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
By the time the United States relinquished control, the Philippine Constabulary 
and Haitian Gendarmerie had been shaped by several years of military campaigning 
against insurgents.  Both constabularies retained their policing responsibilities 
throughout the pacification efforts, but they both came to identify themselves foremost 
as armies.  The counterinsurgency campaigns produced a cadre of Filipino and Haitian 
veterans who accepted the institutional model that American officers had created and 
successfully used to pacify their countries.  The militarization of the constabularies was 
further motivated by immediate security needs at home and from abroad.  The 
Philippines continued to be troubled by peasant uprisings against the landed elite and 
faced an aggressive Japan.  Haiti faced a menacing Dominican Republic on its border as 
well as tension over the existing social order.  The governments in Manila and Port-au-
Prince relied upon their constabularies to secure their new autonomy.  Under these 
conditions, the constabularies’ experience in civil affairs projects influenced them far 
less than their counterinsurgency battles. 
The Constabulary and Gendarmerie were originally created to maintain a peace 
established by U.S. military forces to support compliant governments under U.S. 
auspices.  However, when violence escalated, constabulary officers emphasized military 
skills and organization to make the constabularies more effective in combating 
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insurgents.  In the Philippines, Allen exercised his prerogative to organize battalion-size 
formations of constables for military expeditions and, for a time, all but won operational 
control over the Army’s Philippine Scouts.  Both measures made the Constabulary a 
more effective counterinsurgency force, but they also undermined its identity as a federal 
police institution.  Allen bragged about the diversity of civil functions that his constables 
performed, but the focus of the institution was directed towards militarizing the 
Constabulary.  By the end of the pacification campaigns in 1913, many Filipino 
constables had more experience in infantry tactics than in the enforcement of civil codes.  
The Constabulary had become a small army accustomed to enforcing the broad 
mandates of martial law.   
Likewise, in Haiti, the militarization of the Gendarmerie accelerated under the 
pressure of violent insurgency.  Responsibility for leading the pacification campaign 
during the cacos uprising in 1918 primarily fell upon the Marines when gendarmes 
revealed how poorly trained they were during several clashes with caco insurgents.  
Language barriers, questions of loyalty in the minds of many marine officers, and the 
poor physical condition of many recruits hindered the advancement of gendarmes 
beyond basic drill and garrison administration.  Few of the Haitians that joined the 
Gendarmerie could read and many were in such poor health that simple guard duty was 
difficult, making complex training programs problematic.  While most gendarmes 
proved themselves to be disciplined in ranks and loyal to their officers, it was not until 
Peralte’s uprising occurred that the Marines overcame their fear of mutiny and seriously 
sought to improve the Gendarmerie’s ability to fight.  The hard lessons of 
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counterinsurgency and an awareness that the Gendarmerie would need to defend Haiti 
from invasion prompted marine officers to reconsider the principle role of the Haitian 
constabulary.  They began focusing more on improving the gendarmes’ marksmanship 
and training the growing ranks of Haitian officers in leading infantry missions, 
performing administrative law, managing organizational logistics, and conducting 
ceremonial functions.  The American and Haitian governments formally acknowledged 
the changing role of the Gendarmerie from a civil police force to an army when it 
renamed the constabulary as the Garde d’Haiti in 1928.161   
However, the militarization of the constabularies went beyond tactics and 
organization.  It extended to the human characteristics of the institutions as well.  Both 
constabularies had fought opponents of the government in moral terms, characterizing 
insurgent leaders as manipulators preying on innocent villagers.  Loyal followers of 
these manipulators were described loosely as fanaticos, bandits, and so forth.  Biased 
recruiting practices also ensured that the Constabulary and Gendarmerie would not be 
representative of the nation.  Although driven by necessity, the dominance of Filipino 
recruits vetted by landed interests and lower-class Haitians recruited by marines would 
also destabilize the constabularies as the Constabulary chose sides in a class conflict and 
the Gendarmerie became the battleground between mulatto elites and noir Haitians.  
Under American leadership, both constabularies also modeled an easy blurring of 
boundaries between military and police functions.  The Gendarmerie went further by 
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directly interfering with civil government and vetoing Haitian decisions the United 
States found unsatisfactory.162
Many American officers reduced the pacification conflict into two related moral 
themes.  They described the campaigns as a battle between the occupation and its 
lawless opposition and characterized the constabularies as defenders of the innocent 
peasantry against predatory demagogues, motivated by greed or fanatical religion, 
seeking to exploit the ignorant rural villagers.  The loose labeling of opponents as 
ladrones, pulajanes, and cacos reflected the American tendency to reduce diverse rural 
movements into identifiable enemies with moral overtones.  In the Philippines, 
Constabulary officers frequently referred to their opponents as brigands and fanatics and 
ignored the legitimate grievances that motivated peasants to join with men like Ablen or 
Bulan.  The same officers praised landowning presidentes who stepped out and support 
the pacification, such as Monreal in Sorsogan, oblivious to the fact that they were 
perpetuating the class oppression that predated U.S. occupation of the archipelago.  In 
Haiti, many marine officers used caco and bandit interchangeably in their 
correspondence and distinguished the insurgent ranks from their leadership.  Butler 
dismissed the caco leadership as nothing more than political opportunists and portrayed 
their armies as a mass of discontents “that had nothing else to do and wanted a little 
loot.”163   
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Butler’s successor, Alexander S. Williams, took a more charitable view of the 
caco ranks.  He believed that a majority of them had been coerced into fighting the 
Gendarmerie by caco chiefs leading a corps of bandits and terrorizing villages, maiming 
or executing those who refused.  Williams asserted that once joined the Haitians “felt 
they could not desert” for fear of retribution.  When asked if this meant that victimized 
Haitians had been killed, Williams explained that “in the jungle and in the morning 
twilight it is impossible at 200 yards to tell exactly what a man’s inclinations are.”164  
Both assessments expressed elements of truth.  However, they also overlooked the 
influence of cultural and historical factors that sustained peasant support of the cacos in 
addition to the effects of terrorism.   
The rhetoric of constables defending naïve peasants from the deceptions of 
fanatics and criminals embedded itself in the self-perception of the Constabulary and 
Gendarmerie as well as their proponents among the governing elite.  One provincial 
governor in the Visayas asserted that the mountain attackers have always been “outlaws 
and bandits.  They live in mountain fastnesses and have no visible means of support” 
except for “robbery, arson, and murder.  These bandits sweep down at night armed and 
uniformed upon some unprotected barrio, commit their depredations and return to the 
mountains.”165  In the Philippines, the moral identity as defender of the people produced 
a sense of righteous indignation in the Constabulary.  Allen declared that “any one 
attempting to treat with ladrone bands looking to a surrender will be considered as an 
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accomplice” and “that my policy henceforth is to kill or capture them in the field.”166  In 
Haiti, Williams’ similar views served to justify trial of captured cacos by provost courts 
rather than civil courts.  The Gendarmerie did not trust the Haitian justice system to 
punish the guilty “in such a fashion that the punishment would act as a deterrent.”167  
Thus, American officers set a precedent for the constabularies of vilifying indigenous 
opposition movements and dealing with them harshly that would be repeated 
periodically during the post-occupation era.  This institutional trait set the Constabulary 
and Gendarmerie in opposition to a majority of their countrymen, an alienation that did 
not disappear with the transition to indigenous rule. 
The other human dimension influenced by militarization was the first generation 
of Filipino and Haitian officers.  The Constabulary and Gendarmerie had been slow to 
deliberately pursue the creation of an indigenous officer corps until very late in the 
occupation.  Both constabularies had difficulty finding suitable candidates for 
establishing a reliable corps of officers from within the ranks during the pacification 
campaigns.  W. Cameron Forbes, Philippine Secretary for Commerce and Police, 
observed that “it frequently happens that where a Filipino is advanced to a position of 
authority that . . . he abuses his privileges.”168  Butler encountered similar difficulties 
with Haitian recruits.  “We had very little success with the Haitian officer,” he testified, 
“they were brutal with the people, unnecessarily harsh.”169  During Butler’s tenure as 
Gendarmerie chief, only two Haitians retained their commissions as officers in Haiti’s 
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constabulary, and both were serving in the presidential guard performing ceremonial 
functions.  The others were dismissed for abuses of authority.170   
With very few Filipino and Haitian officers serving, the majority of constables 
experienced the years of occupation as non-commissioned officers or enlisted men.  Few 
of the indigenous officers that replaced their American counterparts had experience in 
managing infrastructure projects or conducting standard police work, but many of them 
had observed the effectiveness of a centralized and disciplined military force during the 
pacification campaigns.  They had also witnessed the regular interventions in civil police 
matters by military and paramilitary forces.  Filipino and Haitian officers would 
remember the demonstrations of military power more than any abstract lessons about the 
separation of military and police functions.      
After the pacification campaigns, both constabularies were pressed to increase 
the level of indigenous participation and leadership in their ranks.  Having adapted to the 
threat of endemic violence, the Constabulary and Gendarmerie required steady 
leadership either to transition them back to civil police duties or to divorce them from 
their policing responsibilities and fully develop them as professional militaries.  
However, both constabularies suffered from leadership changes that likely hindered the 
ambitious transition from taking place before the end of U.S. control.  In the Philippines, 
the Constabulary had benefited from competent and energetic Army officers during its 
battles against insurgents, but these leaders gradually departed the Constabulary as 
resistance subsided and many anticipated American entry into the First World War.  
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Allen left the Philippines in April 1907 before the final pocket of anti-occupation 
resistance had been quelled, and many of the Constabulary’s most experienced Army 
officers had left to seek better promotion opportunities in the U.S. and in Europe by 
1917.  In Haiti, the quality of leadership also peaked early and declined rapidly in 
response to the world war.  Butler left his position as chief of the Gendarmerie in May 
1918, just prior to the eruption of the caco uprising.  
A few proven officers, such as Captain Harold H. Elarth in the Philippines, 
remained with the constabularies and did important work in establishing the post-
occupation officer training programs, but they no longer determined the direction of the 
paramilitaries.  Filipino and Haitian leaders chose not to reform the constabularies as 
police institutions or to weaken central authority by stripping the constabularies of their 
policing responsibilities.  Ruling elites in power, having lost the protection of the U.S. 
military, understood the precariousness of their new governments against foreign threats 
and internal unrest, and their response to these dangers would not only reinforce the 
militarization of the constabularies but also to their politicization. 
 In the Philippines, domestic troubles tested the Constabulary first.  Secular 
peasant protest movements replaced the regional independence movements of the 
Philippine War.  As the Philippine Assembly failed to resolve their grievances, poor 
rural Filipinos organized and turned to armed resistance against the landed elite.  Public 
protests broke out across the archipelago but were especially frequent in the provinces of 
Central Luzon around Manila.  Throughout the 1930s, Constabulary units routinely 
clashed with peasant rebels in towns throughout the archipelago with most of the 
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confrontations occurring in the Central Luzon provinces around Manila.  Manuel 
Quezon, president of the Philippine Commonwealth, increased the size of Constabulary 
garrisons in the region several times, quadrupling Pampanga’s contingent to 400 
constables, and directed the Constabulary to take over the municipal police forces of 
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Tarlac, Pangasinan, Bataan, and Cavite provinces.171   
Protecting the landowners had been an expediency of Allen’s strategy for the 
U.S. pacification campaign, but, in the 1930s, the defense of landed elite interests came 
to be seen as the Constabulary’s primary purpose in the eyes of many Filipinos.  
Constables sometimes leveled the homes of tenant farmers who challenged landlord 
orders.  Constabulary officers in Nueva Ecija and Pampanga ordered their men to shoot 
anyone they deemed suspicious during periods of public disturbance.172  The brutality of 
constables who remained in service under the Japanese after their capture of the islands 
in 1941 proved particularly damaging to the reputation of the Constabulary.  Following a 
large number of the landed elite, many of the officers chose to cooperate with the new 
occupying power and led their constables on numerous raids and patrols against the 
Filipino resistance.  Nenita units under the command of Captain Napoleon Valeriano 
were arguably the most brutal of the collaborating forces.  The Nenitas bore a skull and 
cross-bone insignia and conducted numerous terror raids of suspected villages.  
Valeriano’s constables tortured, murdered, and destroyed homes as part of their 
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counterinsurgency campaign for the Japanese.  To the chagrin of veterans of the 
resistance, Valeriano would survive the war to manage the Philippine government’s rural 
pacification operations in 1949.173
In Haiti, the Garde was confronted by an immediate military threat in the 
Dominican Republic.  In early October 1937, Dominican soldiers and members of the 
Policia Nacional attacked camps of migrant Haitian field workers in the frontier region 
that divides the two nations, killing fifteen to twenty thousand over a period of three 
days.  The savage and systematic killing of Haitians rattled the Garde, cognizant of how 
lightly armed they were compared to the Dominican forces.  However, what disturbed 
them more was the noncommittal response of the government in Port-au-Prince.  Sténio 
Vincent, Haiti’s president from 1930 to 1941, defended the Dominican Republic and his 
government attempted to cast doubt that the massacre had been committed by 
Dominican government forces.  Vincent’s responses to subsequent Dominican-
sponsored raids on Haitian communities along the border were equally tepid.  The matter 
came to a head in December when several Garde officers attempted to assassinate, Major 
Durcé Armand, a trusted relative of Vincent and the president’s chosen commander of 
the presidential guard.  The assassins had hoped that killing Armand would motivate 
Vincent to take a more aggressive stance against the Dominicans.  Instead, the president 
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responded with a purge of suspected Garde officers and consolidated his control of the 
military.174
The confrontation over Haiti’s response to Dominican depredations brought to 
the surface the tension between civilian and military authority inherited from the U.S. 
occupation period.  Cognizant of the cycle of revolution under the cacos and the 
domination of the marines, Vincent and his successor, Elie Lescot, vetted the leaders of 
the Garde based upon political reliability and personal loyalty.  They also implemented 
structural changes to the Garde that created controllable factions within the institution.  
Their measures created personalized militaries that would determine the transfer of 
political power through the rest of the twentieth century.175
The precedents set by Army and Marine Corps leadership and unresolved social 
problems weakened the prospects that either of the militarized constabularies could be 
counted on as apolitical enforcers of the law or benign standing armies.  Instead, they 
became active participants in the battles between social and political factions in civil 
society and within their own ranks.  While appropriate for the pacification phase, the 
militarization of the Constabulary and Gendarmerie established institutional cultures 
incompatible with a domestic police force.  As armies, the constabularies became active 
participants in the political life of their nations.  In the Philippines, the Constabulary 
became a trusted agent of the ruling elite as an independent service and as an integrated 
part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.  The Garde developed into an important 
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arbiter to political succession until Francois Duvalier elevated his party militia, the 
Tonton Macoutes, to the level of a government security force and ended the Garde’s 
monopoly of armed force in Haiti in the 1960s.176
Under competent and stable leadership, the Constabulary might have 
successfully made the difficult transition from being an army to a police force, and the 
Garde could have succeeded in surrendering its police functions to a successor 
constabulary.  However, the institutional identity of both constabularies was grounded in 
the idea that the division between military and civil police functions was one of skill sets 
rather than of important principle.  The Constabulary adopted the broad functions as 
sources of elite pride.  In an official history, it observed that “whoever thought of giving 
the Constabulary this dual role must not have considered the blessing that such duality 
would bring about.”177  The resistance to relinquishing their police functions suggests 
that the Garde took the same degree of pride in its broad mandate. 
Ultimately, however, the internal issues of the constabularies did not decisively 
determine their identity and function in the post-occupation.  With the best leadership 
and entrenched professional norms, the Constabulary and Garde would have been hard 
pressed to sustain them under the political and social conditions present in the 
Philippines and Haiti.  The constabularies were not likely to demilitarize when peasant 
uprisings threatened or when ambitious elites recognized the utility of a having a reliable 
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paramilitary force in their bid for power.  The U.S. occupation provided neither the 
political and military stability to sustain a civil national police nor the environment 
conducive to demilitarizing the constabularies into such a force.  In the end, the 
evolution of the Philippine and Haitian paramilitaries could not be divorced from the 
significant shortcomings that marred the U.S. nation-building efforts. 
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